

**Public Information and Local Government's Electoral Returns,
Evidence from an Information Dissemination Campaign
in the Mexican 2009 Municipal Elections**

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Dear EGAP members:

We originally intended to have some results ready for you, but the outcome data we received so far came in the most inconvenient format and it will take several weeks to clean it. On top of that, in the states we worked there are still several contested elections, thus, the outcome data we have so far is not the official one. In this document you will read about our research design. By the time of the EGAP meeting, all our interventions will be done. We welcome any type of feedback.

-----Please do not circulate this document.-----

**Public Information and Local Government's Electoral Returns,
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Abstract

Despite optimistic views about fiscal decentralization in Mexico, local government's performance has remained poor. Scholarship and policy circles have suggested that lack of mechanisms of accountability, particularly no access to public information, prevents voters from voting out of office inefficient incumbent parties. Yet we know relatively little about the causal effect of information. We conducted an experiment to test if public information on local government's expenditure influences voting behavior in three Mexican states: Jalisco, Morelos, and Tabasco. The experiment consisted of three different interventions. For the first intervention, we distributed a flyer with information on the total amount of money granted to the municipality through the largest infrastructure transfer scheme and the amount of the fund spent by the end of the fiscal year. The second intervention consisted on the distribution of a flyer with the same information as the first flyer, as well as the percent of spending directed to improving services for the poor. And for the third intervention, we distributed a flyer with same information as the first flyer along with information on the percent of the fund that was spent with irregularities.

2. Introduction

Despite optimistic views about fiscal decentralization in Mexico, local government's performance has remained poor. The problem is reflected in their spending patterns. In 2006, more than eighty percent of local government's resources were spent either on the bureaucracy or were unaccounted for. The bad performance of local governments is far from being just a Mexican phenomenon. While local governments are supposed to be better informed about local needs and are more likely to maximize productive efficiency due to electoral constraints, it is well documented that around the world local governments are often subject to elite capture, can engender unnecessary expenditure, and may fail to attract the active participation of the poor.¹

Scholarship and policy circles have suggested that lack of mechanisms of accountability and poor access to information are not only among the reasons why local governments spend in inefficient ways, but are an obstacle to democratic governance across the globe. Since transparent governments tend to be efficient, and opaque governments tend to be inefficient, the availability

¹ (Azfar and Livingston 2007, Banerjee et al. 2001, Bardhan and Mookherjee 1999, Dasgupta and Beard 2007, Hoddinott 2002, Johnson, Deshingkar and Start 2005, Mansuri and Rao 2004, Reinikka and Svensson 2004, Besley and Rohini Pande 2008, Duflo and Chattopadhyay 2005, Humphreys and Sandhu 2006, Stokes 2007, Dahlberg et al. 2006, Hines and Thaler 1995, Agrawal and Gupta 2005).

of information has been linked to bottom-up mechanism of accountability and good governance and the lack of information to corruption. Yet we know little about the causal effect of information. Just as information strengthens good governance and efficiency, efficient governments have more incentives to disclose information than inefficient governments. Moreover, the information dissemination mechanisms are often used by partisan and non-partisan organizations to bring the public's attention to certain facts that advance their own agenda. Thus, the correlation between information and good governance may well be driven by a common third factor. Finally, recent evidence from experimental work shows that in certain contexts, dissemination of information is not enough to overcome voters' apathy (Benerjee et al 2008).

To test the effect of information, this study took advantage of a recent constitutional reform in Mexico that allows the Federal Auditor's Office (ASF) to audit local governments. ASF produced reliable information about local government's spending. With this information we designed an experiment around the July 5th elections with three different interventions. This study aims to test how the use of mass communication techniques can improve accountability and governance at the municipal level. More specifically, this study asks the question: does information on local government's expenditure influences voting behavior in Mexico? This project has funding from an IADB (ICT) grant March-December 2009.

Background

Mexico is a federation integrated by 31 states and a Federal District. Each state elects its own governor and legislature. There are 2,400 municipal governments chosen at the local level. Local election dates are established by state legislation. Federal, State and local authorities are concurrent in only ten states. Elsewhere, there is great variation in terms of timing of local elections. Municipal authorities are elected to serve 3-year terms, and like the president and state governors, may not be reelected. The inability to be reelected in no small part contributes to the lack of accountability measures found at all levels of government in Mexico, since the immediate fate of politicians is determined not by voters but by the political parties. Although there are more than eight active political parties in Mexico, the parties that have dominated politics in Mexico historically and continue, for the most part, to do so today are the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which was in power from 1929 to 2000, the center-right conservative National Action Party (PAN), which wrested control from the PRI in the 2000 elections, and the center-left Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD).

Jalisco Electoral Context

The experiment was run in four municipalities in Jalisco: Guadalajara (the state capital), Tonalá, Tlaquepaque, and Tlajomulco de Zuñiga. The governor of Jalisco, Emilio González Márquez, is a member of the PAN and was elected in 2007 to serve a six-year term. PAN gained control of the majority of municipalities in Jalisco, as well as the state, for the first time in 1994. In the 1997 elections, PAN also won a majority in Congress. In all four municipalities where we ran the experiment, the PAN was the incumbent party and the PRI the main contender, with the exception of Tlajomulco de Zuñiga where the two strongest candidates in the race were the PRI and the PRD. Predictions in Jalisco that the height of political power for the PAN had passed came true as preliminary results from the July 5th poll came in: PRI won control of several municipalities throughout Jalisco, including Guadalajara, Tonalá, Tlaquepaque, and the PRD won in Tlajomulco de Zuñiga.

Morelos Electoral Context

In Morelos, we ran the experiment in three municipalities: Cuernavaca (the state capital), Cuautla, and Jiutepec. As in Jalisco, the governor of Morelos, Marco Antonio Adame Castillo, is a member of the PAN. He was elected in 2006 to serve a six-year term. In Cuernavaca and Cuautla, the PAN was the incumbent party. In Jiutepec, a more rural municipality, the PRD was in power. Following the nationwide trend, the PAN lost control of several municipalities in Morelos, including Cuernavaca and Cuautla, which both went to the PRI in the 2009 elections. The PRD maintained control in Jiutepec.

Tabasco Electoral Context--- ELECTIONS IN PROGRESS

3. Methods: eligibility criteria & settings

During 2009, elections for congress and local governments were held concurrently in the states of Jalisco, Morelos, Estado de Mexico and Guanajuato in July, and Tabasco in October. Nine other states had concurrent elections for congress, local and state governments. Since gubernatorial elections introduce a different dynamic to local elections, and this study is focused on the latter, we first restricted the study to states with elections only for congress and local governments (Jalisco, Morelos, Estado de Mexico, Guanajuato and Tabasco). Among these states, for budgetary reasons, we picked Jalisco, Morelos and Tabasco. Since regional diversity is an important characteristic of Mexican politics, we chose these states in order to get variance in geographic location. We also picked these states because they give us variation in the state's

political makeup with Jalisco and Morelos being PAN-PRI territories and Tabasco being PRI-PRD territory.

The unit of analysis of this project is the electoral precinct. The universe of eligible units was composed by precincts belonging to the three chosen states and belonging to municipalities with a report from the ASF. Together, these criteria restricted our sample to precincts in the following municipalities: Guadalajara, Tlaquepaque, Tonalá and Tlajomulco de Zuñiga in Jalisco, Cuautla, Cuernavaca and Jiutepec in Morelos and Cardenas, Centro, Huimanguillo, Comalcalco and Macuspana in Tabasco.

4. Interventions

Information on municipal government spending was distributed in an attractive, easy-to-read flyer to households in selected voting precincts approximately one week before the local elections were held.² A sample of the flyers is included in the appendix.

Information on municipal spending was collected from reports published by the ASF which are public, available online but hardly accessed by regular citizens. The ASF selects approximately three to six municipalities in each of the 31 Mexican states, along with the *Distrito Federal*, depending on the total number of municipalities in the state and the ASF's budget. The ASF conducts an audit of the federally funded programs that are administered at the municipal level. Since municipalities collect few taxes, federally funded programs represent the largest share of municipalities' income. One such program is the *Fondo para la Infraestructura Social Municipal* (Fund for Municipal Infrastructure, FISM), which allocates federal money to the improvement of roads, water and electricity delivery, sewage systems, and other public infrastructure projects that are executed at the municipal level. The reports by the ASF include information on the amount of money the municipality received; capacity to administer the fund; project kind, quality, number; money spent by the end of the fiscal year and by the time of the audit; to what extent the goals and objectives of the fund were met; and any evidence of false accounting and resource diversion that was found. The information collected for the study came

² The municipal elections in Jalisco and Morelos were held on Sunday July 5, 2009. Flyer distribution in Jalisco took place from Friday, June 26th through Tuesday, June 30th. Flyer distribution in Morelos took place from Saturday, June 27th through Tuesday, June 30th. The municipal elections in Tabasco will be held on Sunday, October 18th. Flyer distribution will likely take place from Friday, October 9th and go through the 13th or 14th.

from the 2007 ASF report, which is the most recent year available and corresponded to the term of the municipal government in office up to the 2009 elections.

Flyers were designed in May and early June in consultation with a locally-based graphic designer. The final flyer designs incorporated the feedback gathered through two focus groups of approximately fifteen people each in Mexico state.³

The experiment consisted of three treatments. Each precinct was assigned either to one of the treatments or the control group. For the first intervention we distributed a flyer with information on the total amount of money granted to the municipality through the transfer scheme FISM and the amount of the fund spent by the end of the fiscal year. The second intervention consisted on the distribution of a flyer with the same information as the first flyer, as well as the percent of spending directed to improving services for the poor. For the third intervention, we distributed a flyer with same information as the first flyer and information on the percent of FISM fund that was unauthorized and/or was found to have irregularities in the accounting process, such as fake or no receipts, over-invoicing, not delivered public works and diversion of resources.

Two firms, one based in Guadalajara and one based in Mexico City, were hired to do the flyer distribution in Jalisco and Morelos, respectively. Flyers were distributed to all households within the boundaries of a treatment voting precinct, and were left in mailboxes, slipped under or wedged in the door or front gate, or taped to the entrance.

In order to ensure that the flyers were being distributed according to protocol, there were various levels of supervision and monitoring in place. Teams of no more than 4-5 distributors were assigned to a supervisor who monitored their activity and did no distribution him/herself. The supervisor's role was to ensure that the correct flyer was being distributed in a given precinct, that the boundaries of the precincts were being respected, and that flyers were being properly placed in the households. In Morelos, the firm employed a GPS monitoring system to ensure that flyer distributors were within precinct limits and were working efficiently and effectively. In addition, project staff from Innovations for Poverty Action was on hand in both Jalisco and Morelos throughout the duration of the distribution in order to ensure that all standards were being met on a consistent basis. On a daily basis, 2 staff people in Jalisco and 3 staff people in Morelos would arbitrarily select certain precincts to visit throughout the day in order to confirm that 1) the flyer

³ In the focus groups sessions, we asked for participants' overall impressions of the flyer drafts, including clarity of the message and its non-partisan nature. Also, we collected feedback on background and foreground color schemes, supporting graphics, layout, and other design decisions.

type corresponded to the precinct's treatment group, 2) the flyers were being distributed to all households within precinct limits, and 3) no flyers were being distributed outside of precinct limits. Although there were one or two instances where protocol was not being followed correctly in the very beginning, steps were taken to correct the errors. Thus, in both states the flying was done according to the protocol specifications.

5. Objectives and Hypotheses

The objective of the three interventions is to test the effect of information on voting behavior. Let y be the incumbent's party vote share, and T_i the treatments. Then incumbent's vote share can be written as:

$$y = \beta_{1*}T_1 + \beta_{2*}T_2 + \beta_{3*}T_3 + \gamma_j + \varepsilon$$

where γ are municipal fixed effects. We expect that:

$\beta_1 < 0$ For most municipalities, the percent of money spent by the end of the fiscal year is far from 100%. Since municipal governments receive money from the federal government every year, people interpret the fact that municipalities do not spend all the money as either lack of administrative capacity or corruption. Thus we expect that this treatment decreases the incumbent's vote share.

$\beta_2 \neq 0$ Most of the municipalities spent a large share of the fund on services for the poor. We expect that the percent of money spent on services for the poor will have heterogeneous effects. If political economy theories based on self interest are correct, among rich precincts the effect should be negative, and among poor precincts the effect should be positive. Then, the overall effect will depend on how the two conditional effects are balanced out.

Being more specific about our expectations for treatment 2, we expect that the slope on T_2 varies depending on the precinct's income. If we allow for this interaction, then incumbent's vote share can be written as

$$y = \beta_{1*}T_1 + \beta_{2*}T_2 + \beta_{3*}T_3 + \beta_{4*}(T_1 * I) + \beta_{5*}(T_2 * I) + \beta_{6*}(T_3 * I) + \beta_{7*}I + \gamma_j + \varepsilon$$

where I is a dummy indicating that the precinct is poor. Then, we expect

$$\beta_4 = 0 \quad \beta_5 > 0 \quad \beta_6 = 0$$


$\beta_3 < 0$ Finally, we expect that learning about the percent of irregularities will decrease the incumbent's vote share.

6. Outcomes

Effects this intervention may have had on voter turnout and/or voter preference will be assessed using aggregate historical elections results along with the results of the 2009 election. In addition, in order to get a sense of the extent to which people received and read the flyer, we conducted a small-scale survey post-intervention. Twenty-five study precincts in both Jalisco and Morelos were randomly selected among all study precincts (treatment and control) to receive the survey. Ten surveys were done in each precinct, for a total of 500 surveys. A firm in Mexico City was hired and trained to conduct the surveys, and surveying took place the 11th and 12th of July (with a redo in Jalisco on the 16th due to inability to confirm proper first-round survey administration there).

7. Sample size

To determine the sample size, we run power calculations based on the aggregate historical elections results. There is no prior study on the effect of information in Mexico, but previous studies on voting behavior find effect sizes of around five percent (De La O 2007). Outside Mexico, "GOTV" campaigns in the US have been found to have effects of around 9-10 percent. An effect of this size corresponds to about half standard deviation in our sample. There are reasons to expect that our intervention will not have as strong effect as a GOTV campaign in the US because Mexican voters tend to be rather uninterested in local elections and voting choices are highly influenced by partisanship. Therefore, we anticipated a smaller effect size. Since our outcome measure is reported by the states' electoral institutes, we do not need to collect it. This means that the control group is basically free. We took this into consideration when running the power calculations and setting the sample size.



From these power calculations, we decided on an N of 150 per treatment and 3599 in the control group. See maps in the appendix for the distribution of the treatment.

8. Randomization-- Sequence Generation

Each state was allocated 50 precincts per treatment. The randomization was blocked by municipality. Stata was used to generate a random number for each precinct by municipality. Precincts were ranked by the random number. The first N precincts were chosen to be part of treatment 1, the next N precincts were chosen to be in treatment 2, the next N precincts were part of treatment 3. The rest of the precincts were part of the control group. N was set in proportion to the municipality's number of registered voters.

9. Randomization-- Allocation Concealment

Since the unit of analysis was the voting precinct, allocation concealment to participants was not an issue.

10. Randomization—Implementation

Randomization and assignment to treatment were implemented by the principal investigators.

11. Blinding (masking)

Principal investigators were not blinded to group assignment. For logistical reasons, the two firms distributing the flyer were informed about the group assignment one week before the intervention.

12. Statistical methods

In order to measure the effect, if any, of the intervention, we will primarily be analyzing election results at the precinct level. We have compiled municipal election results dating back to 1995 (6 election cycles) and will analyze these results together with the results from the 2009 elections. In addition, we will analyze the results from the survey applied in Jalisco and Morelos.

13. Participant Flow

In total, 150 electoral precincts were randomly assigned to each of the 3 interventions, for an anticipated total of 450 treated precincts. In Jalisco and Morelos where the experiment is completed, due to challenges in the field (see section 19 - Adverse Events), the actual number of precincts treated at 100% in these two states is 295 out of the 300 assigned. Within treatment 1, 97 precincts out of the 100 assigned were treated at 100%, 2 were treated at 80%, and one precinct was not treated at all. Within treatment 2, all 100 precincts randomly assigned in Jalisco and Morelos were treated. Within treatment 3, 98 precincts out of 100 were fully treated, 1 was treated at 80%, and for another precinct, the level of treatment is unknown.

14. Recruitment--Not Applicable

15. Baseline data

Table 1: Baseline Characteristics (Jalisco and Morelos)

Variable	Treatment 1	Treatment 2	Treatment 3	Control
	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)
Illiteracy rate	2.44 (1.69)	3.17 (2.70)	2.80 (2.11)	2.33 (1.93)
% without primary school	18.58 (5.73)	20.56 (5.53)	19.51 (6.25)	21.49 (6.47)
% without sewage	7.23 (4.09)	7.27 (4.52)	7.08 (3.41)	6.29 (3.81)
% without electricity	6.75 (3.90)	6.55 (4.10)	6.29 (3.31)	5.76 (3.54)
% without safe water	9.47 (8.63)	10.95 (12.57)	10.01 (10.95)	8.48 (10.73)
% hh without cement floor	2.40 (3.43)	3.54 (5.75)	3.07 (4.85)	2.46 (4.30)
% without refrigerator	11.89 (6.02)	12.63 (7.30)	11.63 (5.26)	9.80 (5.23)
Number of registered voters	1553.96 (1156.30)	1532.83 (714.60)	1638.25 (996.19)	1589.89 (1250.30)
Pan vote share 2006	.4211 (.084)	.425 (.078)	.422 (.088)	.451 (.085)
PRI vote share 2006	.2929 (.102)	.290 (.099)	.292 (.095)	.343 (.085)
PRD vote share 2006	.1924 (.119)	.186 (.122)	.192 (.124)	.115 (.089)

Note: After adjusting for municipality fixed effects, none of the differences are statistically significant.

16. Numbers analyzed --WORK IN PROGRESS

17. Outcomes and estimations--WORK IN PROGRESS

18. Ancillary analyses

Subgroup analyses:

While the type of information in all three interventions was the same, the content, of course, was particular to each municipality. Thus, we will run the following subgroup analyses.

- effect conditional on the level of administrative capacity
- effect conditional on the level of corruption
- effect conditional on the level of redistribution to the poor

Spillovers:

The nature of the design presents several opportunities for treatment groups to contaminate the control group. Firstly, spillovers can be detonated if our treatment is picked up by the local media or political parties. In order to minimize this type of spillovers, the distribution of the flyer was done in average four days before the official end of the political campaigns and a week before the election. By law, three days before the election, political parties are prohibited from campaigning. So far, we found no evidence of either the media or political parties picking up the treatment in Jalisco and Morelos.

Second, the most evident form of spillovers is geographical. Precincts in the control group close to precincts in the treatment group have a higher probability of being unintentionally treated compared to precincts geographically distant from the treatment group. To account for this possibility, we will run the following subgroup analyses:

- With aggregate data, estimate the treatment effect conditional on geographical proximity.

Finally, spillovers could be caused by residents of treated precincts talking to voters in the control group, regardless of the geographical proximity of the precincts. To partially address this point, in the survey we asked whether respondents in treatment and control groups recognized the flyers and whether they discussed the flyer's content with anyone.

19. Adverse events

In our original state selection we had included Mexico State, neighbor to Mexico City and one of the most populated (and corrupt) states in the country. While looking into the flyer distribution, however, we learned that the state government's legislation gives the municipal governments authority to regulate the distribution of flyers. Beside the fee, one requirement to distribute any type of flyer is to submit a copy for approval. Given the content of our flyers, we

decided not to work on that state, otherwise, the flyer application would very likely still be under review.

During the distribution of the flyers we confronted a limited number of adverse events (e.g., assault of flyer distributors, dog bites) and obstacles (e.g., gated neighborhoods, extreme population density) that prevented the full treatment of some precincts. In Jalisco, there were five precincts that were not fully treated as a result of these challenges. Three of these five were treated at approximately 80% (due to the density of these precincts), 1 was not treated at all (due to denied access), and 1 was likely not treated at all, though the treatment level cannot be verified. In this last precinct, the flyering firm was denied access to the gated community, but left the flyers with a security guard who told them that she would distribute the flyers to the individual households.

20. Discussion --WORK IN PROGRESS

21. Generalizability


Flyer distribution as a mass communication strategy in Mexico is widely used. Political parties, local governments, local businesses and others frequently hire services to flyer door-to-door, on sidewalk corners, and at stoplights to get their messages and offers across. Government officials and businesses view flyering as a cost-effective strategy to reach targeted sectors of the population. In this sense, the intervention is not artificial.

The design of the experiment took into account the regional diversity of Mexico. Thus, we feel confident that the design will allow us to make generalizations at least to the rest of Mexico.

22. Overall evidence -- WORK IN PROGRESS


Appendix

Jalisco
Electoral Precincts in the Treatment Group



0 1 2 4 Kilometers

Morelos.
Electoral Precincts in the Treatment Group



0 1 2 4 Kilometers

All Treatments (Front of flyer)

Este es un volante informativo
y no pertenece a ningún partido político.
www.enterate-Mexico.org/guadalajara

¿Sabes
quién está a cargo de
**caminos,
drenaje,
luz y agua
en tu
comunidad?**
Entérate.

Fuente: Informe del Resultado de la Revisión y
Fiscalización Superior de la Cuenta Pública 2007

www.enterate-Mexico.org/guadalajara

FLYER 1. Frente 21.5 X 18.6 cm

Treatment 1

En 2007, tu municipio Guadalajara
recibió del Fondo
para la Infraestructura Social Municipal
90 millones 618 mil pesos
y gastó
47 millones 412 mil pesos

¡Conoce
los beneficios
que recibió
tu municipio!

48%
NO SE
GASTÓ

52%
SE
GASTÓ

www.enterate-Mexico.org/guadalajara

Fuente: Informe del Resultado de la Revisión y Fiscalización Superior de la Cuenta Pública 2007

FLYER 1A Vuelta 21.5 X 18.6 cm

Treatment 2

En 2007, tu municipio Guadalajara
recibió del Fondo
para la Infraestructura Social Municipal
90 millones 618 mil pesos
y gastó
47 millones 412 mil pesos

24% SE GASTÓ EN OTRAS ZONAS

76% SE GASTÓ EN ZONAS POBRES

¡Conoce los beneficios que recibió tu municipio!

www.enterate-Mexico.org/guadalajara

Fuente: Informe del Resultado de la Revisión y Fiscalización Superior de la Cuenta Pública 2007

FLYER 1B Vuelta 21.5 X 18.6 cm

Treatment 3

En 2007, tu municipio Guadalajara
recibió del Fondo
para la Infraestructura Social Municipal
90 millones 618 mil pesos
y gastó
47 millones 412 mil pesos

54% GASTO QUE NO CUMPLE CON LAS NORMAS

46% GASTO QUE SI CUMPLE CON LAS NORMAS

¡Conoce los beneficios que recibió tu municipio!

www.enterate-Mexico.org/guadalajara

Fuente: Informe del Resultado de la Revisión y Fiscalización Superior de la Cuenta Pública 2007

FLYER 1C Vuelta 21.5 X 18.6 cm

2009 Project Timeline

	March	April	May	June	July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec
Prepare budget & compile historical elections data	■									
Finalize study design; compile flyer information; complete randomization		■	■	■						
Hire printing firm; conduct qualitative research; final flyer design; compile precincts maps			■	■	■					
Hire flyering firms; flyer distribution and monitoring in Jalisco and Morelso (June 26-July 1)				■	■					
Follow-up survey in Jalisco and Morelos					■	■				
Submit requests for 2009 elections results data (Jal. & Mor.)						■	■			
Finalize Tabasco flyer; compile Tabasco precinct maps; hire flyering firm							■	■		
Flyer distribution and monitoring in Tabasco (Oct. 9- Oct. 14th)								■	■	
Submit requests for 2009 elections results (Tabasco)									■	■
Data analysis										■
Final report										■

Project Activities by Month

March: Drafted initial budget; requested and compiled historical elections data for project municipalities

April: Finalized study design; compiled flyer information for participating Jalisco and Morelos municipalities

May: Researched and hired a printing firm; requested precinct maps from Instituto Federal Electoral; hired graphic designer and completed flyer design; completed qualitative research (6 interviews with municipal treasurers and 2 focus groups)

June: Printed final flyers; compiled maps of all treatment precincts; hired short-term consultant; signed contracts with flyering firms; organized monitoring of flyering effort in Morelos and Jalisco; monitored flyering in Jalisco and Morelos

July: Hired and trained survey firm; conducted survey in Jalisco and Morelos to assess whether people received and read the flyer

August: Cleaned survey data; compiled Tabasco flyer information; hired Tabasco printing and flyering services; requested Tabasco precinct maps from Instituto Federal Electoral

September (projected): Draft and print Tabasco flyers; compile Tabasco precinct maps; sign contract with Tabasco flyering firm

October (projected): Flyer in Tabasco; conduct monitoring of flyering

November & December (projected): Compile 2009 election data from all three states; conduct data analysis; draft final report

Items	Detail	Unit price (pesos)	Quantity	# days	Total Price	Exchange Rate	Estimates - \$
Personnel							20,598
Project Coordinator	Full-time until July 09						13,078
Country Director	(15% April to July)						2,491
Project Coordinator	50% until sept-december						5,028
Internships/Consultancies							1,853
Graphic Designer	Flyer design	350 for Jalisco y Morelos, 100 for Tabasco					450
Web design/maintenance	\$50 to host/\$400 to design		400	1			400
Local Intern (July)	3-week internship (full time)		5,000	1	5,000	13.2	380
Intern (2) per diem for travel (July)	7 + 4 days at 200 pesos/day		200		11	2,200	13.2
Local intern/coordinator (Oct)	7 days at 50 USD/day			1			350
Intern per diem for travel (Oct)	7 days at 200 pesos/day		200	1	7	1,400	13.2
Project Expenses							35,194
Printing flyers (Jalisco/Morelos) + Shipping (Jalisco/DF) + IVA							10,018
Printing flyers (Tabasco) + Shipping + IVA	Final paid in USD						4,325
Jalisco Flyering	Final paid in USD						5,000
Morelos Flyering	Final paid in USD						5,294
Tabasco Flyering	Quote from Concepto y Punto		0.68	100,000	68,000	13.2	5,152
Focus group payments	80 pesos/ person (those not affiliated with host organization)		80	14	1	1120	13.2
Payment to NGO for hosting focus groups	700 flat rate + 530 for food					1230	13.2
Surveying in Morelos and Jalisco	Surveying costs					69,000	13.2
Travel							3,857
Survey monitoring in Morelos	One-day monitoring effort (car, gas, tolls)						65
International travel (PI, summer '09)	2 RT tickets (US-Mexico)						983.96
International travel (RT for PC)	1 RT ticket (US-Mexico)						274
Local airfare	2 RT tickets for local air travel (Tabasco)						550
Local bus	Bus fare from DF to surrounding states		2,000			13.0	154
Local taxis	Taxis within and outside of DF		4,000			13.0	308
Car rental in Morelos (flyering)	2 cars for 2-3 days						115
Car rental in Jalisco (flyering)	1 car for 7 days at 300/day;		300	1	7	2100	13.2
Car rental in Jalisco (flyering)	1 car for 3 days (35 USD/day)						105
Car rental in Tabasco (flyering)	2 cars for 6 days at 500/day		500	2	6	6000	13.0
Local car rental (for qualitative research)	6 days @ 250 pesos/day		250	1	6	1500	13.2
Gas						4500	13.2
Tolls	Tolls for interstate travel		3000			3000	13.2
Lodging							1,207
Hotel lodging for Morelos Flyering	3 people/approx. 3 nights				4500	13.2	341
Hotel lodging for Jalisco Flyering	2 people/6 nights				4450	13.2	337
Hotel lodging for Tabasco Flyering	6 nights x 850 pesos/night		850	6	1	5100	13.0
Hotel lodging for qualitative research	2 nights				900	13.2	68
Hotel lodging (pre-flyering - Jalisco)	2 nights				900	13.2	68
Miscellaneous							1,936
INEGI data	Purchasing INEGI cds						500
Communications	Internet/Skype/cell use	\$85 USD/month					765
Bank Charges	(20 per wire per 14 wires)						280
Office, admin, stationery	(up until August 31)						194.44
Coverage for other meals	(up until August 31)						46
Misc	From August 31 onwards						150
TOTAL							64,644