Dear Experimenter,

Here is a typical scenario: A researcher runs an experiment to find out whether a treatment has an effect. She finds a difference between her treated and control units. She reports this difference to her colleagues and also provides a confidence interval for what she now calls a “treatment effect”. She thus makes two statements: one about a comparison of treated and control units and another about a plausible range of effects.

Randomization makes the comparison statement meaningful as a causal inference (i.e. one can imagine the counter-factual condition in which treated were control and vice-versa) and also believable (i.e. the treatment effect ought to only reflect systematic differences caused by the experimental intervention and not other distinctions between units). What makes the statement about a confidence interval meaningful or believable?

The researcher reports a confidence interval because she wants to say something like, “it could have been otherwise.” She sees only one number from her study, but she imagines that it could have been otherwise. Or, at least, she knows that skeptical and grouchy people will ask, “I see you have an effect. It seems quite small. Is is basically the same as zero? Is your effect basically just chance variation?” Say she provides a small $p$-value for a null hypothesis test of no effect. The grouch might respond, “I see that if your null hypothesis of no effect were true, one would only expect to see a treatment effect as large or larger than yours one in a thousand times. But, what are these ‘times’? What does ‘probability of observing my effect given the null’ mean?” An easy and excellent answer would be to say, “By ‘times’ I mean, each time I draw a new sample from the nearly infinite but well-defined population using my well-specified sampling plan. My null hypothesis is about the population to which I aim to infer from my sample.” Even a grouch would have to at least give the researcher a grudging nod with that answer.

So, we know what makes experimental comparisons meaningful and credible, but what about $p$-values or confidence intervals about those comparisons? Statistical inference is meaningful when the target of inference is clear. That is, when we have sampled from a real population, we have something towards which we desire to infer: the population. We observe a sample mean, and statistical inference encodes what we expect to observe in the population given the sample.

Did this researcher draw her experimental pool from a population? Or do these happen to be the villages willing to cooperate with her (a “convenience sample”)? Given what she learned in her statistics class for political science graduate students, her statistical inference is not likely to be very meaningful unless she either knows how nature produced her data or she has sampled from a population. In this paper, we present a different thought experiment that will allow her to make statistical inferences meaningfully:

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1Many political scientists substitute a population-generating-engine (or data generating process, or model of outcomes) for a real population. Others use the thought experiment of a “super-population”. And still others re-direct inference toward the mental states of the scientific community. Statistical inference can be meaningful in any of these thought experiments as long as we can justify them: for example, super-population claims are sensible as long as we know how our sample was drawn from the super-population (thus linking meaningfulness with credibility); population-generating-formulae require other explanations and justifications.
We run an experiment because our target of inference is from the treated group to the control group. Our target of inference is a counter-factual: based on observing how some units respond to treatment, we infer how all of the units would have responded had they been treated [or had treatment been withheld].

Statistical inference is credible when our observations are linked to our target of inference in some clear way — when we know how our sample arrived from our well-defined population or our data generating process. In addition, statements about p-values or confidence intervals commonly require other justifications: large samples and independence of observations are two of the most common justifications.

Thus, the mean of 2 units drawn via a simple random sample from a large and well-defined population supports meaningful statistical inference to that population, but it would be hard to calculate a 95% confidence interval based on those data which would not contain the true population value only, and exactly, 5% of the time. Standard t-tests require central limit theorems, which tend not to operate with \( n = 2 \). At the same time, one could imagine a convenience sample of 50 arguably independent units for which statistical tests would operate as advertised, but for which the answers would not be easily interpretable. Berk (2004, Chapter 4) poses the “probability of what?” question to clarify these concerns: for the 2 units randomly sampled from a large population, the answer is “probability of seeing the same thing in a new sample” or “probability of seeing an answer like the one in the sample in the population”; for the convenience sample the question is difficult to answer without more information.

The inventors of randomized experiments were particularly concerned about how to make statistical inference both meaningful and credible for their experiments — agricultural studies on convenient sets of fields near research stations. Neyman (for average treatment effects in large samples) and Fisher (for arbitrary sharp null hypotheses in arbitrary size samples) each came up with a different way to allow the act of randomization to justify statistical inference — that is, to allow statements about ranges of plausible values for treatment effects (i.e. confidence intervals) to be meaningful and credible based only on the design of the study. In the intervening years, despite continuing development of these ideas in some statistical fields, social scientists have forgotten about these facts. Instead, we randomly assign interventions within convenience samples and then report \( p \)-values for which the theoretical justifications require sampling from infinite populations or knowledge of data generating processes. We know this is wrong in theory. Is it wrong in practice? Sometimes.

With large experimental pools and well-behaved outcomes and homogeneous treatment effects, linear models (especially least squares models for continuous outcomes)
approximate Neyman’s randomization based statistical inferences very closely (Green 2009; Schochet 2009). That is, statistical inference from an experimental result may be meaningful by referring to the randomization assigning treatments and may be credible by using the linear model as an approximation as long as the approximation itself is justified in the particular design analyzed.

What should one do when the approximation is suspect (when (a) randomization as an instrument is weak and/or (b) the sample size is small and/or (c) the outcome is binary or otherwise very non-Normal and/or (d) the treatment effects are very heterogeneous)? What about when we care about some function of the potential outcomes other than the average treatment effect? Or perhaps when one desires to assess proposals for covariance adjustment before actually estimating effects? This paper proposes one set of methods that respond to these needs.

First, it teaches about how randomization can, in principle, make statistical inference meaningful and credible using Fisher’s framework rather than Neyman’s for clarity, simplicity and flexibility. Then it goes beyond the few textbook discussions of randomization-based inference to discuss how one may both take advantage of the precision enhancing and random imbalance-adjusting properties of the linear model while still making statistical inference meaningful and credible based only on the randomization occurring within the experiment. And finally, it addresses the question about choice of linear model specifications and discretion which has bedeviled students of experimental methods: power analyses of different test statistics may be done before estimating treatment effects in our approach.

For most of you, this paper will not be relevant: you have well-behaved outcomes with large samples and very little heterogeneity of treatment effects. For the rest of you, I hope this paper is useful, at the very least to alert you to another way to make statistical inference of experimental results as compelling as the you already do for the causal inferences.

This is a work in progress.

I look forward to your comments.

Jake

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6Freedman notes that Fisher’s framework is immune from his criticisms in an aside in his paper criticizing regression analyses of experiments. In other work we take advantage of Neyman’s framework — we are not partisans in that old debate!
“Probability of What?”:
A Randomization-based Method for Hypothesis Tests and Confidence Intervals about Treatment Effects

Jake Bowers ** Costas Panagopoulos††

October 7, 2009

Abstract

How should one estimate and test comparative effects from a field experiment of only 8 units (i.e. where consistency as a property of estimators offers little comfort)? What does statistical inference mean in this context?

Although we are taught to infer to a well-defined population from a sample, or from a sample of outcomes to a model of such outcomes, in a randomized experiment the most basic and important inference is between the treatments: after all, the point of randomizing is to allow us to say how the treatment group would have behaved had treatment been withheld. Most common tools for inference in political science are justified as tools to infer to infinite populations from samples generated with known sampling plans or to models known to generate such populations: they are not built to infer between treatment and control in an experiment, although they may often well approximate such inferences.

In this paper we show how one can base testing and estimation on models of the design of the study, and specifically, on the process by which the values of the explanatory variable were produced. These models of assignment form a basis for valid hypothesis tests, confidence intervals with correct coverage, and point estimates.

As an example, we show how one may use design-based inference to make credible tests using a unique field experiment of the effect of newspaper advertising on aggregate turnout with only 8 observations. In addition, we present some innovations in the use of linear models as a way to allow outcome- and parameter-models to assist the design-based inference without requiring commitments to the usual assumptions that would be required for direct causal inferences using those methods and which would protect the analyst from charges of data snooping.

**NOT FOR CIRCULATION. Assistant Professor, Dept of Political Science, University of Illinois @ Urbana-Champaign Corresponding Author Contact Information: 702 South Wright Street, 361 Lincoln Hall, Urbana, IL 61801 — 217.333.1203 — jwbowers@illinois.edu. Acknowledgements: Thanks to Dan Carpenter, Ben Hansen, Mark Fredrickson, Tommy Engstrom and Joe Bowers.

††Assistant Professor, Dept of Political Science, Fordham University
1 Statistical Inference in the Land of Make Believe

Statistics as currently practiced in political science requires a lot of imagination: we imagine that nature produced our outcome variable according to some known probability distribution (i.e. we posit a data generating process); we imagine that our sample size is close to infinite; we pretend that our data arrived via a known sampling mechanism from a known population and we fantasize that we know the mathematical formula which relates control variables with both the variable(s) of causal interest, called here the “explanatory variable”, and the outcome. Sometimes we add to this list of stories the name of the probability distribution(s) which describes our uncertainty about the effects of our covariate and explanatory variables prior to estimation.

Data generating process (DGP) models require at least some such stories. And these stories in turn require a set of explanations about how the values of the causally important, or explanatory, variable appeared in our data (i.e. about the research design producing our data): were they randomly assigned? did units (e.g. people) consciously select which values to take on? or was the process otherwise haphazard (or unknown but not random)? or perhaps a more or less known function of other variables? And, of course, the meaningfulness of our results depends crucially on how these values (and the values of the outcome variable) map onto the concepts with which we explain how the world works (i.e. about concepts and measurement).

We often call these stories, “assumptions”, and a large part of statistics as applied in the social sciences focuses on helping articulate exactly how worried we ought to be when our assumptions are approximations.

Of course, assumptions help us simplify the world enough to ask and answer specific questions. And the best storytellers compel us by carefully and clearly justifying each required story. For a simple example, consider how one might justify the assumption that our outcome was produced by nature according to a Poisson process. A weak justification of this assumption might be to say, “I observe counts. Counts are often conveniently modeled as a Poisson DGP.” A strong justification might be to notice that, at the micro-level, the values of the outcome emerge from a process in which events happen in time independent of one another. Given this micro-foundation, one can logically deduce that a Poisson DGP for the counts of events occuring in a given unit of time follows. If, however, the values of the outcome are observed to be counts, but the analyst has no detailed story about how those counts came to

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1Perhaps one which makes our analysis units independent of one another, or perhaps which produces some known dependence among them.

2Note that least squares and all Bayesian models imply a DGP story, although only Bayesian models must be explicit about prior distributional stories.

3For more accessible discussion about the different justifications for statistical inference see Berk (2004 chapter 4), and for discussions linking these justifications (or “modes”) to the potential outcomes framework for causal inference see Rubin (1991, 1990).

4Perhaps this process is itself the result of some strategic interaction of units, some cooperative interaction, some random interaction, or no interaction. We avoid providing a substantive theoretical story here in order to keep attention on the statistics.

5Equivalently, one can deduce that the amount of time between the occurrence of such events follows an exponential distribution (See, inter alia, Ramanathan (1993 page 64), King (1989 page 48-50), Grimmett and Stirzaker (1992 page 229)). Derivations of both are available in most texts on probability and an expanded example is available online at http://jakebowers.org/PAPERS/poissonproof2.pdf.
be, then she would be wise to feel uncomfortable telling the Poisson story (even if there is no other easily available story for her to tell). That is, DGP models (among the other justifications for a given bit of data analysis) can be made more or less plausible depending on the persuasive and logical skills of the story-writer.

Although artful and careful persuasion is possible, the creation and justification of these stories, or “commitments” (Berk, 2004), can often seem very burdensome to scholars who have compelling political and social and economic theory to engage, but who don’t have much to say about the statistical stories that justify and make meaningful common data analytic practice. In this article we propose to make the justification of statistical inference less burdensome for at least some political scientists. In so doing, we hope to help scholars return and maintain their focus on scientific inference (and the closely related causal inference), concepts, measurement, and theory rather than on half-believed rationalizations of conveniently chosen models.

We do this by introducing, explaining, and demonstrating a mode of statistical inference which is frequentist but which does not require the stories demanded by DGP based approaches. Of course, it, like all methods, requires its own fictions and fantasies. Specifically, “randomization inference”, as developed by Neyman (1990) and Fisher (1935) does not require a model of outcomes but it does require a model of assignment. Thus, since it requires its own stories, it is not uniformly better than extant approaches. We will show, however, that the pretense required of this mode can be easily assessed — an assessment of a kind that would be quite difficult for DGP based approaches. Basically, since inference in this mode is based primarily on stories about the design of the study rather than on outcomes, there is more possibility for an analyst to provide strong and credible justifications for their statistical inference in so far as the design of their study is under their control. In contrast, inference requiring models of outcomes is almost never based on parts of the study under the control of the researcher, and thus, such stories are harder to believe and require more work to be credible.

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6 And as a frequentist approach does not require explicit justifications of prior distributions.

7 This body of techniques closely related to “exact inference” when asymptotic approximations are not used and to “permutation inference” — a term which highlights one of the mechanisms for generating estimates. We use “randomization inference” here and elsewhere to emphasize connections of the technique with design. Although these terms are very closely related, they are not identical. For example, Neyman (1990), Imai (2008), Hansen and Bowers (2009) demonstrate randomization based inference that is neither exact nor permutation based while Keele et al. (2008) advocate an exact and permutation based approach in randomized experiments. We will demonstrate both exact and approximate versions of this mode of inference in this paper.

8 Bayesian approaches also require a statement about a data generating process. Assessment of the assumptions required of such models is also possible, of course, although such assessments are less informative than those used to check approximations used in randomization inference, the kind of inference introduced in this paper. However, it is worth noting that, in addition to the kind of formal linking of data-generating-process claims with real-world processes sketched in the case of the Poisson distribution, one may use research design to rule out certain kinds of linear models and selection processes. And a mode of assessing the full model that has emerged from Bayesian scholars, “inspection of the predictive posterior” has great utility for both Bayesian and frequentist approaches which require DGP models and related parameterizations (See Gelman et al. (2004) and Box (1980) for elaboration and explanation of these kinds of useful ideas for model checking and fit for Bayesian models.)
This paper proceeds by introducing a substantive political science problem which might give pause to someone whose only tool is based on stories about how the outcomes were produced. Then, using the example of an 8 city randomized study of newspaper advertisements and turnout we delve into the details of randomization inference and illustrate, in fact, how regression analysis can aid such inference without requiring the kinds of commitments that usually burden analysts. Finally, we show how this mode of inference allows analysts to make choices about regression specifications before estimating treatment effects (in contrasts to extant approaches).

1.1 Example: Can newspaper advertisements enhance turnout in low salience elections? The case of the 8 City Newspapers Randomized Field Experiment.

In the days just before the November 2005 elections, C. Panagopoulos fielded an experiment to assess the effects of non-partisan newspaper ads on turnout in low salience elections. This was, to our knowledge, the first experiment to investigate the impact of newspaper ads on turnout, and as a pilot study, it was small, involving only eight cities, matched into pairs on the turnout in the previous election. Within each of the 4 pairs, one city was assigned at random to receive black-and-white newspaper ads in local newspapers encouraging citizens to vote. Panagopoulos (2006) provides more detail on the design of the experiment and detailed analysis of the conclusions. Table 1 shows all of the observations in the study with associated design and outcome features.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Pair</th>
<th>Treatment</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saginaw</td>
<td>MI</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sioux City</td>
<td>IA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle Creek</td>
<td>MI</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midland</td>
<td>MI</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxford</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowell</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yakima</td>
<td>WA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richland</td>
<td>WA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Design and outcomes in the Newspapers Experiment. Treatment with the newspaper ads is coded as 1 and lack of treatment is coded as 0 in the ‘Treatment’ column.

We see here Saginaw (control) and Sioux City (treated) in one pair. Turnout in Sioux City increased from before the treatment to after the treatment by 1 point (22 vs. 21) and was higher than its control unit (Saginaw) after treatment (22 vs. 16). In addition, turnout in Saginaw (which was not exposed to the experimental newspaper ads) decreased by 1 point (16 vs. 17) from the election before the treatment to the election after the treatment. Those three different pieces of information suggest that ...

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9About 281 cities with populations over 30,000 held a mayoral election in 2005. The Newspapers study focused especially on the roughly 40 cities with indirect election of mayors (i.e. where mayors are elected by city councils, not directly by the public). And, among these cities, only those cities in which the city council had been unanimous in their election of the mayor in the previous election were considered potential experimental units. After collection of covariates (such as vote turnout in the previous municipal election and partisanship of the election) roughly 9 cities had complete data to allow matching into pairs, and roughly 1 city was discarded as not easily matchable with any of the others on the basis of turnout in the previous election. [These are rough numbers. Check.]
the treatment had a positive effect on Sioux City. However, a thoughtful reader will have, by now, realized that each of those three comparisons have some flaws: something other than the treatment could have caused turnout to increase over time in Sioux City, baseline turnout was higher in Sioux City than Saginaw, and it is easy to wonder whether, in the absence of treatment, Sioux City would also have had a slight decline in turnout in the same way that occurred in Saginaw. In some senses we might think that the simple control versus treated comparison of 22-16=6 percentage points of turnout would be the right estimate of a treatment effect for Sioux City here. Yet, since Sioux City only increased by 1 percentage point from baseline, we might wonder if somehow 6 pct pts overstates the effect. That is, in this dataset, one challenge will be to use information other than mere assignment to treatment and control to produce compelling estimates of treatment effects. This study also is very small: there are only 8 cities grouped into 4 pairs. The small sample size raises doubts about estimation strategies grounded in arguments about consistency (of either points or intervals). The availability of baseline outcomes (as well as other covariates) suggests that, since we know more about these units, we should use this information to enhance the precision of our estimates if not also the persuasiveness of our comparison. This example will allow a very clear and easy exposition of randomization inference, and the complications regarding use of baseline and covariate information offer an opportunity to show how randomization inference allows for more than just simple comparisons of treated and control units.

1.2 Plan of the Paper
The paper shows how to estimate effects from these datasets without large-sample assumptions, infinite population sampling models, or data generating process models. When we do introduce the convenience of large-sample approximations or the precision enhancement arising from a model of outcomes, the statistical inference will still be based entirely on the design of the studies. The linear models used here will not require commitments to the standard assumptions of these models: they will be used to reduce noise in the outcomes, not to directly estimate treatment effects. The confidence intervals we produce will include hypotheses that reject a true null no more than the pre-specified $1 - \alpha$ of the time: that is a 95% CI will be guaranteed to contain the true estimate at least 95% of the time if the experimental manipulation/policy intervention was re-assigned. In contrast, extant methods relying on large samples will produce confidence intervals labeled as, say, 95% CIs but which will in fact contain the true estimate less often than specified (and less often is as precise a statement as we can make about the failure of these large sample CIs to have correct coverage without simulation). [simulations comparing coverage to add empirical confirmation to this theoretical claim are planned but not completed]

First, we will demonstrate the most basic form of Fisher’s randomization inference on the Newspapers study. Since that study is small, it allows us to lay bare the details of the method to (1) aid comprehension by newcomers and (2) contrast with other modes of inference which would require many more pages and much more background to fully describe. Once it is clear how the design of the study (the

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10In this paper we use “model of outcomes” and “data generating process model” interchangeably. Both imply a probability distribution governing the values of the outcome and some parametrization of that distribution.
randomization and, in this case, blocking into pairs) makes the statistical inference meaningful and credible, we then explain some extensions to the basic framework which enable the use of linear models to increase precision and adjust for random imbalance. And finally, we show how power analyses of different linear model specifications can help analysts make choices about covariates (in addition to balance assessments) while protecting themselves from charges of data snooping.

Notice that our proposals here are not meant to replace other justifications for statistical inference. Nor do we think that in-sample inference is the end goal for scientific inference [as opposed to statistical inference let alone causal inference]. If one knows how the process understudy occurred, then there is no need for these techniques — the scientific question becomes merely about calibrating the known data generating process with the data in hand. Of course, if one is running a randomized experiment, this often means that we know less about how nature or society produced the process at hand, and, in such cases we hope that reminding political scientists of what the originators of randomized experiments thought about statistical inference (and updating and re-conceptualizing these thoughts for modern data analytic practices and tools) will be useful.

2 The Newspapers Study

What is the effect of newspaper advertisements on aggregate vote turnout in the Newspapers dataset (shown in Table 1)? By “effect” here we refer to a counterfactual comparison. The advertisements can be said to have an effect if the turnout of cities \( i \) treated with the advertisements (\( Z = 1 \)), \( r_{Z=1,i} \), would have been different in the absence of advertisements (\( Z = 0 \)). We can write the potential outcome to control as \( r_{Z=0,i} \) or more simply \( r_{0i} \) to denote the response of city \( i \) without advertisements, and \( r_{Z=1,i} \equiv r_{1i} \) for the response of city treated with advertisements.\(^{11}\) By “causal effect”, \( \tau \), we refer to a comparison of potential outcomes such as \( \tau_i = r_{1i} - r_{0i} \). Notice that this framework is a conceptual heuristic: we cannot actually ever observe both \( r_{1i} \) and \( r_{0i} \).\(^{12}\) We could represent these potential outcomes in the Newspapers design as follows in Table 2.

For example, we observe that turnout was 16% in Saginaw. We take this to mean turnout in the absence of treatment (\( r_{0i} \)) is 16% in Saginaw. We don’t know, without further information and/or assumptions, how the turnout in Saginaw would have been had Saginaw instead of Sioux City been exposed to newspapers advertisements in the 2–3 days before the election. Clearly, the act of making causal inferences

\(^{11}\)We can write \( r_{0i} \) because we also assume that the potential turnout in city \( i \) is unaffected by treatment to other cities. If the treatment giving to one city, \( j \), influenced outcomes in another city \( i \), we would have to define the potential response of city \( i \) to control in terms of both the treatment assigned to it and also to city \( j \): perhaps \( r_{Z=\{0,0\},i} \) where \( Z = \{0,0\} \) would mean that both units received control rather than treatment. This assumption is reasonable in this dataset, but by no means is a trivial assumption to maintain in many political science studies.\(^{12}\) The idea that one must compare possible outcomes, or “potential outcomes” to make causal effects meaningful was introduced in the 1920s by Neyman (1990) and most prominently elaborated and developed by Rubin (1974, 2005). For more on the intellectual history of this idea and spirited arguments in its favor see Holland (1986), Sekhon (2008). For commentary and criticism of the potential outcomes framework (also often known as the Neyman-Rubin conceptualization of causal effects) Brady (2008). And also see Rosenbaum (1999) for practical strategies using this framework in the context of observational studies.
Table 2: Treatment ($Z$), Observed outcomes ($R$), and potential outcomes ($r_1, r_0$) for Cities ($i$) within Blocked Pairs ($b_i$) in the Newspapers Experiment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$i$</th>
<th>$b_i$</th>
<th>$Z_i$</th>
<th>$R_i$</th>
<th>$r_{1i}$</th>
<th>$r_{0i}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saginaw</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sioux City</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle Creek</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midland</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxford</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>?</td>
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<td>Lowell</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Richland</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

requires replacing the “?”s in Table 2 with meaningful numbers. How can we get them?

Let us recall our definition of a causal effect as a comparison of potential outcomes: $\tau_i = r_{1i} - r_{0i}$. If there were no effect for, say, Sioux City, $\tau_{\text{Sioux City}} = 0$ implying that $r_{1i=\text{Sioux City}} = r_{0i=\text{Sioux City}}$. That is, if there were no effect, turnout in Sioux City without advertisements would be the same as turnout with advertisements. We know that turnout in Sioux City in the presence of advertisements was 22%. Thus, if advertisements had no effect on turnout, turnout in Sioux City in the control condition would have had to be 22%. Notice that positing, or hypothesizing, that treatment had no effect and then representing “no effect” in terms of our definition of a causal effect allows us to fill in the missing data. This way of thinking about what “no effect” means is very clear: “no effect” means that we would observe the same outcomes for each unit regardless of experimental condition assigned. This kind of hypothesis implies something specific about each and every unit in the data. Often called a “sharp null hypothesis”, this idea and randomization-based causal inferences based on them (but not on potential outcomes) was first proposed and developed by in [Fisher (1935)].

So, a strict null hypothesis of “no effect” implies that, for all $i$, $r_{1i} = r_{0i}$. If the hypothesis were true, the missing potential outcomes in Table 2 would be known. Most importantly, we would know the potential outcomes under control for the treated observations. Combined with the observed outcomes for the control group, a given sharp null hypothesis specifies how the outcomes would look in the absence of treatment. Given a vector of potential outcomes in the absence of treatment generated by a sharp null hypothesis, we can now generate a distribution representing the possible treatment effects that could arise from the experiment even if there were no effect. To do so, we will need (1) a test statistic summarizing the relationship between treatment assignment and observed outcomes, and (2) a model of the design of the study (i.e. a model of how treatment was assigned), and eventually, in order to calculate a confidence interval (3) a model of the effects of the study.

The example of the Lady Tasting Tea given in [Fisher (1935, Chapter 2)] is perhaps the most famous application of the sharp null hypothesis and randomization inference. The Newspapers example used here is more interesting in that it is not a toy example, has to do with voting turnout rather than tea-tasting, and has other features (like stratified treatment assignment and a continuous outcome) that make it a more useful example for political scientists. For more on the Lady Tasting Tea and its usefulness as an example in comparative politics see [Sekhon (2005)]. See also [Agresti and Min (2005)].
2.1 Test statistics summarize treated-versus-control differences

Random assignment requires us to consider comparing cities $i$ within pair $b$ across treatment assignment as the basis for our test statistic. We know that cities within pairs received newspaper ads without regard to any other characteristic of those cities. Thus, comparing 2005 turnout in cities receiving the newspapers (the treated cities) to 2005 turnout in cities which did not have those particular newspapers ads (the control cities) is, in expectation, a comparison that reflects only the manipulation and not any other characteristic of the cities.

Write $R_{bi}$ for the observed percent of registered voters who voted in 2005 in each city $i \in \{1, 2\}$ in pair $b \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$. The observed outcomes are a function of potential outcomes: $R_{bi} = Z_{bi}r_{1bi} + (1 - Z_{bi})r_{0bi}$. We use capital letters to refer to random quantities and lowercase letters to refer to fixed quantities. In this experiment we know that treatment was assigned at random, thus we know that $Z$ is random. Potential outcomes are assumed to be fixed characteristics of units which can be revealed by the experiment. We can write a simple difference of mean turnout within pairs as:

$$t(Z, R)_b = \frac{\sum_i Z_{bi}^T R_{bi}}{\sum_i Z_{bi}} - \frac{\sum_i (1 - Z_{bi}^T) R_{bi}}{\sum_i (1 - Z_{bi})} = \text{Mean Turnout Among Treated Cities in Pair } b - \text{Mean Turnout Among Control Cities in Pair } b.$$  

And we can calculate the overall difference as the average of the within pair averages from equation 1:

$$t(Z, R) = \frac{\sum_{b=1}^B t(Z, R)_b}{B}.$$  

The within-block formula written in equation 1 is generalizable to situations where blocks contain more than one treated unit and/or more than one control unit. The formula for calculating the overall effect as a weighted average of within-block averages is not generalizable to different sized sets because it assumes that each block ought to contribute equally to the overall average. When we have one treated and one control unit per block, one could argue that each block contains the same amount of information about the overall treatment effect as any other. When the block sizes vary, then blocks with very lopsided treated-to-control ratios provide less information than blocks with more equal ratios and weights ought to reflect this difference.

A cleaner way to combine those formulas would be to use directly use vector notation where $Z$ collects the $Z_{bi}$ and $R$ contains the $R_{bi}$, and the notation $|Z|$ means the “size” of $Z$ or $|Z| = Z^T 1$:

\[ \text{See Hansen and Bowers (2008a) for generalizations of these formulas to unequal sized blocks and unequal sized clustered random assignment and for formal arguments about how to weight the contributions from different blocks and clusters. See Imai (2008) for another randomization-based argument in favor of weighting unequal sized blocks equally.} \]
Applying equation 1 or 3 to the Newspapers dataset gives an average difference of treated and control units within pairs in turnout after treatment of 1.5 percentage points. Is 1.5 percentage points a “real” result? Say, for the sake of argument, that there were no effects of newspaper advertisements: how much more (or less) plausible does this observed result make the null hypothesis? If we want to use probability to answer this question, we would need to compare the fixed quantity that we observe \( t(Z, R) = 1.5 \) to the distribution of such statistics defined by the null hypothesis \( H_0 : \tau_i = 0 \).

2.2 Simple Inference for a Null of No Effect

The probability distribution we require represents the probability of observing all of the possible outcomes of the experiment in the case that the treatment had no effect. That is, it would tell us the probability of observing \( t(Z, R) = 0 \) percentage points, and the probability of observing \( t(Z, R) = 1.5 \) percentage points (and any other reasonable effect) under the hypothesis of no effects. So, first we need to know the range of possible effects and then we need to assign some probability to each of these effects. We will see here that the design of this experiment allows us to accomplish both tasks with no other assumptions. We use this method (often called a “permutation” method or an “enumeration” method) in this section of the paper to show the simplicity of randomization based tests.

We begin with the task of delineating the domain of this distribution — the values of the treatment effect for which we require probability statements. Here we have four blocks, each with two units, and each with one and only one treated unit. So, within block we have \( \binom{2}{1} = 2 \) ways to assign treatment. And across the four pairs, we have \( \prod_{s=1}^{4} \binom{2}{1} = 2^4 = 16 \) ways to assign treatment.\(^{15}\)

Table 3 shows the 16 different ways to assign treatment to cities, respecting the blocking structure of the design. This matrix is often labeled \( \Omega \) and it contains all of the possible assignment vectors \( z \) of which \( Z \) is the one we observed. For example, the first possible assignment vector \( z \) from the set of all possible such vectors \( \Omega \) would assign treatment to Saginaw but control to Sioux City, while the 2nd \( z \) would assign control to Saginaw and treatment to Sioux City.

This table is the model of assignment of the study.\(^{16}\) For each \( z \in \Omega \) in Table 3 we can calculate a test statistic \( t(Z, R | Z = z) \) representing the differences between treated and control units for each of the possible ways that assignment to treatment could have happened. If the sharp null hypothesis of no effect were true then \( r_0 = r_1 \) and then \( R = Zr_1 + (1 - Z)r_0 = Zr_0 + (1 - Z)r_0 = Zr_0 + r_0 - Zr_0 = r_0 \). That is, if our null were true, what we observe in \( R \) is what we would observe under the control

\[^{15}\text{Although we have eight units, four of which were treated, the number of possible assignments is not } \binom{8}{4} = 70 \text{ because of the blocking into pairs. In this way the Newspapers dataset is even a bit simpler than the classic Lady Tasting Tea example.}\]

\[^{16}\text{One could write this model more parsimoniously as is often done, or merely list all of the possible ways for treatment to be assigned.}\]
condition. Thus, the collection of \( t(Z, R | Z = z \in \Omega) \) summarizes all of possible test statistics if the null were true. Since we know the probability of seeing each \( z \in \Omega \), we now have the distribution of the test statistic under the null hypothesis. In this case, the probability of seeing each \( z \) happens to be uniform with probability 1/16.

Now we are ready to answer our question about how strange it would be observe a mean difference as far away from 0 as 1.5 if, in fact, there were no effect. The probability of observing a result as large or larger than 1.5 is the sum of the probabilities of at 1.5 and larger. The probability of observing a result as small or smaller than -1.5 can be calculated in the same manner. And the two-sided \( p \)-value is the sum of those calculations. The full probability distribution, \( t(Z, R) \), is very simple: each vertical line represents the amount of probability for each possible outcome — most of the mass is concentrated at 0, -1.5 and 1.5, with small amounts of mass scattered across the line from -5 to 5. More detail is shown in Table 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>city</th>
<th>pair</th>
<th>Z</th>
<th>( z \in \Omega )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saginaw</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0 1 0 1 0</td>
<td>1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sioux City</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 0 1 0</td>
<td>1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle Creek</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0 1 1 0</td>
<td>0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midland</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0 1 0 0</td>
<td>1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxford</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 1 1 1</td>
<td>1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowell</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yakima</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0 1 1 1</td>
<td>1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richland</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Possible treatment assignments for the Newspapers study. Pairs of cities define the columns. Permutations of the assignment mechanism (within pair fixed random assignment) define the rows.

A common two-sided \( p \)-value is defined as the sum of the absolute value of the mass at or greater than the observed value\(^ {17} \) In this case the there are 12 ways out of 16 to observe a value as far from zero as 1.5 (or -1.5). Thus, the weight of evidence that our observed value of 1.5 places against \( H_0 : \tau = 0 \) is summarized by \( p = 12/16 = 0.75 \).

\(^{17}\)Another common definition is twice the one-sided \( p \)-value for test statistics with only positive domains (like ranks) or twice the smaller of the two one-sided \( p \)-values for asymmetric randomization distributions which is equivalent the sum of the absolute value of the mass at or greater than the observed value in symmetric distributions. See Rosenbaum (2010, page 33) and Cox et al. (1977) for arguments in justifying twice the minimum of the two one-sided \( p \)-values.

Other test statistics Notice that nothing about this procedure requires a comparison of simple means. We could produce the same result with a standardized version (i.e. the test statistic of the simple t-test). Or we could use a sum of ranks among the
treated: For example, if \( q = \text{rank}(R) \), then we could define the rank sum test statistic:
\[
t(Z, q) = q^T Z.
\]
Notice that since the ranks are a function of observed responses, they are also functions of potential outcomes. Different test statistics might have different statistical power or might otherwise summarize results in more or less substantively meaningful ways. Lehmann (1998) and Keele et al. (2008), among others, suggest rank based tests for their insensitivity to outliers and enhanced power compared to mean-based tests. Table 5 shows the distribution of the paired-rank sum test statistic under the sharp null hypothesis of no effect. The observed rank sum is 6, and the two-sided \( p \)-value is \( 2 \times 0.4375 = 0.875 \). Since rank sums are always positive, the two-sided \( p \)-value must be defined as twice the one-sided \( p \)-value rather than using the absolute values of the domain of the randomization distribution.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( t(Z, R) )</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( p(t(Z, q)) )</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Randomization based probability distribution of the paired rank sum test statistic under the sharp null hypothesis of no effect.

2.3 Summary of the Test of the Sharp Null of No Effects

Specify a hypothesis about \( \tau : H_0 \equiv \tau = \tau_0 \), where \( \tau \) is some function of potential outcomes to control \( r_{0i} \) or treatment \( r_{1i} \).

Specify a test statistic \( t(Z, R) \). For example, if \( q = \text{rank}(R) \), then \( q^T Z \) (rank sum). Or \( \frac{Z^T R - (1-Z)^T R}{(1-Z)^T} \) (diff of means)\(^{19}\)

Compute the test statistic as implied by \( H_0 \) \( t(Z, R - \tau_0 Z) \). Under the sharp null of no effect \( R = r_0 \).

Compare \( t(Z, R) \) to \( t(z, R) \) for all possible \( z \in \Omega \). Equation 4 summarizes the doubt cast by our observed test statistic against the null hypothesis:

\[
\Pr(t(z, R) \geq t(Z, R) | \tau = \tau_0) = \frac{\sum_{z \in \Omega} 1\{t(z, R) \geq t(Z, R)\}}{K}
\]

where \( \Omega \) is the matrix of all possible treatment assignments, and \( K \) is the total number of possible assignments in \( \Omega \), in the case of independent assignment across strata, \( K = \prod_b (\sum_{z_i} n_{bi}) \). In our case \( K = \prod_{s=1}^4 2 = (2)^4 = 16 \).

Notice that this test did not require any model about how turnout occurs in cities, nor did it require assumptions about large sample sizes, or any particular functional form relating assignments and outcome (recall that the test of the sharp null is represented by the same pattern of \( r_0 \) regardless of model of effects). The mechanism by which the \( p \)-values were produced is completely transparent (especially so in the case with \( K = 16 \)).

\(^{18}\)For example, Hansen and Bowers (2009) used “number of votes” rather than “probability of voting”.

\(^{19}\)Here I have used paired versions of these test statistics because of the random assignment within pairs. I am using matrix notation \( R \) rather than \( R_{bi} \) for clarity on the page.
Yet, we are left with some discomfort: First, political science actually knows something about turnout. That is, although precise models of outcomes may be a burden (and more of a burden with outcomes like the Adverse Events data), we would like to use what we know. We will show later how models of outcomes may be used within this framework without requiring inference itself to be based on models of the data generating process. Second, knowing that the null of no effect is not implausible is not the same as producing a range of values that are plausible. We will next demonstrate how such tests as we have executed here may be “inverted” (cite to page in Lehman among many other books) to estimate a range of plausible values for the effect of newspaper advertisements on vote turnout.

2.4 Confidence Interval: Assessing Hypotheses about effects

So far we have assessed a hypothesis about no effects. If we want to talk about plausible effects, we must assess hypotheses about some non-zero effects. Recall that a confidence interval is defined as the range of hypotheses that would be accepted at some $\alpha$ level denoting the risk of falsely rejecting a true hypothesis. That is, given a choice of acceptable Type-I error rate, one can create a confidence interval out of hypothesis tests. This method, called “inverting a hypothesis test” is a well known procedure and is not specific to randomization inference [cite a couple of textbooks like Rice (1995) or others perhaps Hodges and Lehmann (1964)?]. For example, we have so far assessed $H_0 : \tau = \tau_0$, $\tau_0 = 0$ and have $p$-values of 0.75 and 0.875 for the mean and rank-based test statistics respectively. Regardless of test statistic, $\tau_0 = 0$ must be within any reasonable confidence interval (say, of $\alpha = .025$ for a 95% CI let alone $\alpha = .12$ for a 88% CI). That is, $\tau_0 = 0$ is a plausible value for the effect of advertisements on turnout. What about other values?

In order to assess hypothesis about other values we must now add some structure to the problem. Namely we must posit a model of effects. First, we’ll explain what we mean by model of effects, and second demonstrate how such a model allows us to assess hypothesis about effects and thereby to produce a confidence interval.

2.4.1 Models of Effects

For the rest of this paper we will be working with a very simple model of effects, namely the constant, additive effect model:

$$\tau = r_{1i} - r_{0i} \quad (5)$$

which implies that $r_{1i} = r_{0i} + \tau$: meaning, the potential outcomes under treatment are merely the potential outcomes under control plus some constant $\tau$ which is the same for all cities. I make this assumption both for convenience and also to make these analyses parallel those that others might do using models of outcomes (e.g. linear model based analyses which wrap models of effects into models of outcomes). There is nothing about this mode of inference, however, that requires such a model of effects.

Recall our notation:

**Treatment** $Z_{ib} \in \{0, 1\}$ for unit $i$ in strata/block/pair $b$. $Z$ collects all of $Z_{ib}$. 

11
**Observed Outcomes** \( R_{ib} = Z_{ib} r_{1ib} + (1 - Z_{ib}) r_{0ib} \) are a function of random assignment and fixed potential outcomes.

**Covariates** \( x \) is a matrix of fixed covariates (variables uninfluenced by treatment). Strata indicators \((b = 1 \ldots B)\) are covariates.

Recall also that we define a treatment effect as a function of potential outcomes. Here are merely a few of the possible models of treatment effects that one may use:

1. **Constant, additive effects** \( r_{1ib} = r_{0ib} + \tau \) (like \( t \)-tests — very common, implied by most linear model based analyses)

2. **Varying, additive effects** \( r_{1ib} = r_{0ib} + \tau_{ib} \) (especially useful for binary outcomes [Hansen and Bowers] 2009; Rosebaum, 2002a, 2001; See, e.g.)

3. **Effect proportional to dose** \( r_{1ib} = r_{0ib} + \beta (d_{1ib} - d_{0ib}) \) (Z changes D — instrumental variables based approaches imply this model. Hansen and Bowers (2009); Bowers and Hansen (2006) combine this model with the model of varying, additive effects.)

4. **Dilated effects** \( r_{1ib} = r_{0ib} + \delta (r_{0ib}) \) (Effect of the treatment larger among those with larger \( r_{0ib} \))

5. **Displacement effects** \( r_{1ib} > \theta > r_{0ib} \) where \( \theta \) is some value of the order statistics of \( r_{Cib} \). (the effect of the treatment strongest/evident at the 80th percentile).

Recall that to test the sharp null of no effects, no particular model of effects is required. It turns out that the sharp null of no effects implies the same pattern of \( r_{0ib} \) for all such models of effects. However, to test hypotheses about effects (which is required to produce confidence intervals), a model of effects is necessary and different models will have different confidence intervals. In fact rejection of a null hypothesis could either be said to tell us something about the particular value of \( \tau \) posited or that our model of effects is wrong (Rubin 1991, § 4.1)

Consider \( H_0 : \tau = \tau_0 \) to generalize from the simple hypothesis of no effect. If \( \tau = \tau_0 \) and assuming a model of constant, additive effects from equation 5 where \( r_{Tsi} = r_{Csi} + \tau_0 \), then:

\[
R_{bi} = Z_{bi} r_{1bi} + (1 - Z_{bi}) r_{0bi} = Z_{bi} r_{0bi} + Z_{bi} \tau + r_{0bi} - Z_{bi} r_{0bi} = r_{0bi} + Z_{bi} \tau_0 \]

\[
r_{0bi} = R_{bi} - Z_{bi} \tau_0
\]

So, our null hypothesis again tells us what our potential outcomes would be as a function of the hypothesis, assignment, and observed outcomes. But this time rather than showing that \( H_0 : \tau = \tau_0 \Rightarrow R_{ib} = r_{0ib} \) our model of effects means that \( H_0 : \tau = \tau_0 \Rightarrow R_{ib} = r_{0ib} + Z_{bi} \tau_0 \). Notice that the test of a constant additive effect
of 0 and as a test of the varying additive effect of $\tau_{0i} = 0$ imply the same pattern of potential outcomes and observed outcomes if $\tau_0 = \tau_{0i} = 0$

Now consider a model of effects in which each unit may have a different effect but the effect is still additive: $r_{Tsi} = r_{Csi} + \tau_i$. Now, $H_0 : \tau_i = \tau_{0i}$ and since a hypothesis must specify a pattern of responses across all units, we state $H_0$ as a comparison of $N \times 1$ vectors: $H_0 : \tau = \tau_0$ where $\tau_0$ contains a pattern of $\tau_{0i}$ which may differ across the units of the study. For a null of no effect $H_0 : \tau = \tau_0 = 0$. However, any $\tau_0$ is testable by forming the hypothesized $r_C = R - Z\tau_0$ and using $t(Z, R - Z\tau_0)$ as the test statistic to summarize the comparisons of potential outcomes under the null. In this case of varying effects, the posited model of effects also restricts the range of possible $\tau_0$. For example, if we assume a simple model of effects $r_{Tsi} \geq r_{Csi}$, we would not consider hypotheses which would contradict this statement. For these rest of this paper, we use a model of constant, additive effects so as to make what we are doing here as similar to the the common practice of estimating “average treatment effects” as possible.

### 2.4.2 A Confidence Interval by Inverting A Set of Hypotheses

The logic of § 2.2 can apply directly here. Now the test statistic is $t(Z, R - Z\tau_0)$ rather than $t(Z, R)$, but Table 2 still represents the ways that the experiment could have occurred. Thus, for a given hypothesized value of $\tau$, $\tau_0$ where the “0” stands for null hypothesis, we can calculate $t(Z, R - Z\tau_0)$ for all of the $z \in \Omega$ and refer to equation (4) for a $p$-value to summarize the implausibility of this $\tau_0$. If the $p$-value is greater than or equal to our $\alpha$ value, $\tau_0$ is inside the CI, otherwise it is excluded from the CI as implausible.

Say we want to test $H_0 : \tau = 1$. Our model of effects and the logic of equation (7) says that, if our null hypothesis were true, potential outcomes to control among the treated would be potential outcomes to treatment minus $\tau_0 = 1$: $r_{0bi} = R_{bi} - Z_{bi}\tau_0$. This operation of removing the hypothesized effect from the treated group is the second addition to the simple test of the sharp null of no effects. However, once we have specified a model of effects and adjusted outcomes according to a given hypothesis, we can evaluate the evidence against this hypothesis using the same procedure as above: for each of the possible $z \in \Omega$ we calculate $t(Z, R - Z\tau_0)$ for all of the $z \in \Omega$ and refer to equation (4) for a $p$-value.

Using the paired Wilcox rank sum statistic and applying it to all 16 of the $z \in \Omega$ we discovered that $\tau_0 \in \{-7, 6\}$ formed the boundaries of a confidence set within which the two-sided $p$-values were all greater than or equal to .25 and outside of which the $p$-values were smaller than or equal to .125 — an 88% CI (recall that a 100$(1 - \alpha)$ CI contains hypotheses not-rejected at level $\alpha$). A 66% CI (which approximates ± 1 standard error for Normal variates) is [-2,5] percentage points of turnout change. We cannot calculate a 95% CI from these data because the atom of the probability distribution is of size 1/16: we could, in principle have a 100$(1 - (1/16)) \approx 94\%$ one-sided CI but in practice such a CI would be incredibly wide.

We could produce a point estimate by shrinking this confidence interval. Yet, for

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21This is a very informal way of talking about what is called a Hodges-Lehmann point estimate
this application, the confidence intervals themselves summarize the evidence adequately. The plausible effects of newspaper advertisements on turnout in these 8 cities ranges from -7 percentage points of turnout to 6 percentage points of turnout.

2.4.3 Fundamental Assumptions, Discreteness, Flexible Hypothesis Testing, and Simple DGP-Based CIs

This section includes some discussions which might well end up as footnotes, but which we thought might deserve more space in this working paper.

Fundamental Assumptions: Comparability and Non-interference

In producing these confidence intervals we added a model of effects to our story about random assignment. It turns out the random assignment story implies a particular, and more general assumption that is required for causal inference and there is another general assumption that we also justify by appealing to the design, without which we would not be able to conceive of let alone estimate effects as we have done.

What do we know with confidence about this design? We know that treatment was randomly assigned within pair. We know that treatment was assigned in such a way as to prevent advertisements given to one city to have any effect on the turnout of any other city (within or across pairs). We know that each city had some probability of receiving the treatment before it was actually assigned, and that assignment was governed only by a random number generator, and thus not related to any other feature, observed, or unobserved, of the cities. These sentences paraphrase two of the technical requirements for filling in the missing data in Table 2 on page 6 by any method. These requirements are often known as “ignorability” and “non-interference”; “non-interference” is itself related to a broader set of assumptions collectively known as the “stable unit value assumption” or SUTVA. [cites on ignorability and SUTVA from Brady, Sekhon, Rubin and Rosenbaum].

The ignorability assumption is important for everything we have done so far. In this particular case, the ignorability assumption amounts to us believing that, within matched pair, each city had an equal probability of receiving the treatment. Thus, any other differences between cities will merely add the same constant to each spike in the randomization distribution and will not change our $p$-values. If we are wrong about this assumption, then our randomization distribution will not reflect the posited null hypothesis, and it will be hard to know what our $p$-values mean.

The non-interference part of the SUTVA assumption is important for the confidence intervals but not for testing the sharp null of no effects (Rosenbaum, 2007). This assumption does allow us to write $r_{i_1}$ (potential outcome to treatment for unit $i$) versus $r_{11111111}$ or $r_{11111110}$ (potential outcome to treatment for unit $i$ given some combination of treatment assignment in the rest of the study). That is, we can define models of effects by writing simple functions of $r_{i_1}, r_{0_1}, Z$ because we have assumed that the potential outcomes of each unit are independent of each other.

[Brady, Sekhon, Rubin and Rosenbaum].

---

22Evaluating $t(Z, \text{rank}(R - r_0Z))$ for each of the 16 $z \in \Omega$ is, in fact, not necessary. One can produce a $1 - \alpha$ confidence interval using the paired rank sum test with one command in R (R Development Core Team, 2009): if $R_b = R_{ib} - R_{jb}, i \neq j$ (i.e the responses within pair are summarized by their differences), then `wilcox.test(R, alternative="two.sided", conf.int=TRUE, conf.level=.88)` produces an 88% confidence interval that is the same as the one arrived at above by direct enumeration.
Discreteness of Enumerated CIs Above we defined the 88% CI as $[-7, 6]$ but also noted that the boundary $p$-values inside the interval were .25 and those right outside the interval were .125. In most large sample hypothesis testing regimes, the $p$-value just inside the boundary of the interval are only a tiny bit larger than those outside it. In this case, our 88% CI actually could encompass an 80% CI or even a $75+\varepsilon$% CI (where $\varepsilon$ means “just a little bit”) since the $p$-values we observe just inside the boundary are .25. Notice one feature of confidence intervals created using randomization inference on display here: The probability that a confidence interval constructed in this way contains the true value of $\tau$ is at least $1-\alpha$ (Rosenbaum, 2002c, page 45). In this way, confidence intervals created using randomization inference are guaranteed to have correct coverage, and will be conservative if their significance level (88% or $\alpha = (1/8)$) is not exactly the same as their size. Rosenbaum (2002c, Chapter 2) also proves that these intervals are unbiased and consistent (such that more information is better — produces smaller intervals).

Composite Confidence Intervals Although we have created confidence intervals by testing null hypotheses, we have not discussed alternative hypotheses. Yet, we know that specification of the alternative hypothesis will matter a great deal for the ability of a given test to reject the null. A two-sided alternative of $\tau \neq \tau_0$ requires twice as much evidence against the null to reject it as a one-sided alternative such as $\tau > \tau_0$. Since we create the confidence intervals by testing many hypotheses, we have many opportunities to reject or not-reject. So far, we have compared every null against the two-sided alternative. This alternative makes sense especially for the sharp null of no effects: The null of $\tau_0 = 0$ could imply no extant guesses about $\tau$ (and thus $H_A: \tau \neq \tau_0$). Yet, testing for effects implies that we are willing to consider non-zero values for $\tau$ — at least provisionally. If we posit a negative value, say, $\tau_0 = -1$, then what is the alternative? It could still be $\tau \neq \tau_0$, but, notice that we already know (from our first test of no effects) that $\tau$ could be 0, and thus we have a sense that $\tau > -1$. Entertaining $\tau_0 = -1$ after having tested $\tau_0 = 0$ implies that we are not really interested in the two-sided alternative, but in the one-sided alternative that $\tau < \tau_0$. A similar logic can apply to a hypothesis of $\tau_0 = 1$ (i.e. that this null can be thought of as really implying an alternative of $\tau > \tau_0$.) A confidence interval for $\tau = r_1 - r_0$ could thus be constructed as a two-sided interval for nulls where $\tau_0 = 0$ and two one-sided interval for nulls where $\tau_0 \neq 0$. Notice, this proposal involves specifying the set of alternatives at the same time as specifying the set of nulls — the alternatives would be defined only by the nulls, not by the data. Most analytic constructions of confidence intervals do not have any easy way to stitch together a confidence interval out of independent parts in this way. Rosenbaum (2008) provides more general theory that encompasses the simple example described above. In this section of the paper, we will continue to build two-sided confidence intervals, although we could make smaller confidence intervals using the approach outlined here; confidence intervals that would have the same operating characteristics of the simpler intervals.

WWLRD (What would linear regression do?) A t-test from a linear regression with dummy variables representing pairs in this case report a 95% CI of [-7.73, 10.73]. Ignoring the paired structure of the data yields [-36.05, 39.05]. Both of these tests require
either large samples of independent, homoskedastic observations or an assumption about an independent, homoskedastic, Normal data-generating process. Freedman (2008a) points out that, even in large samples, or even if the Normal DGP is roughly correct, treatment and control groups almost always have different variation on the outcome variable and thus linear regression in the case of randomized experiments does not produce correct confidence intervals. Green (2009) suggests that Freedman’s concerns may have little effect on much of common large-sample and/or DGP model-based analysis of political science experiments. What we have shown in this paper so far is that a DGP process model is not necessary for statistical inference from an experiment. What Freedman (2008a); Green (2009); Schochet (2009) teach us is that statistical inference for treatment effects from linear regression is meaningful as an approximation to the randomization-based results — and that this approximation is often quite good. Of course, one may also claim that one knows that a Normal process (say, many small independent counter-acting perturbations summing) produces the outcomes of ones experiment, or that one has sampled from a real population in some known manner. And in those cases, the theoretical basis for the statistical inference can rest on a combination of justifications (randomized experimental treatments within a randomly sampled set of units from a population known to be generated by a Normal process).

Ought one to prefer a DGP process model when analyzing the results of an experiment? We have shown that it is unnecessary although it may be a useful approximation. It is also worth noting here it has long been known that that the validity of a DGP process model also depends on the validity of an assignment model [cite to Heckman, Achen, Rubin]. Thus, adding a DGP model to the analysis of an experiment does not imply that one can therefore spend less time on the model of assignment.

2.5 Bringing the DGP back in: Model-assisted, Randomization-justified Inference

Yet, we must recall that political scientists are not ignorant about turnout. That is, although the DGP ought to seem like a burden, and the clarity and simplicity of the randomization-based interval ought to appeal, knowledge of outcomes ought to help us somehow. More information should be better. The only question is how to use the additional information while maintaining our focus on models of assignment as the basis for statistical inference.

We introduced the rank-based transformation of \( R \) above for three reasons: First, we noted that rank-based tests tend to have more power than mean-based tests with non-normal outcomes. Second, we wanted to depart from the common use of “average treatment effects” in the causal inference literature — not because such usage is a problem, but, to show that the average is merely one possible summary of effect and thus, we hope, expanding the possibilities for applied analysts. Third, we wanted

\[ \text{Schochet (2009) finds similar results in the context of public policy evaluations.} \]

\[ \text{The only mode of inference that I can think of which actually (and easily) can handle such a combination of claims is Bayesian inference. See for example, Barnard et al. (2003); Horiuchi et al. (2007) in which models of outcomes, of missingness in outcomes, of compliance, and of assignment are combined in the analysis of field experiments.} \]

\[ \text{For those readers in the know, this paper is not a Fisherian manifesto contra Neyman. However, we are taking a Fisherian line here because we feel it is (a) particularly clear and (b) allows the Neyman} \]
to plant the idea that one could be creative about test statistics to foreshadow this section.

Recall that the procedure for randomization inference depends testing hypotheses about potential outcomes and a model of effects. Together, $H_0 : \tau = \tau_0$ and $\tau_0 = r_1 - r_0$ imply a particular pattern of $r_0$ that we can observe by adjusting observed responses such that $r_0 = R - \tau_0Z$. We want to know something about $t(Z, r_0)$ and the hypothesis and the model of effects provides $t(Z, R - \tau_0Z) = t(Z, r_0)$ since we cannot observe $r_0$ for all cities directly. The variance in the distribution of $t(Z, r_0)$ depends in part on differences in potential outcomes given different treatment assignments (i.e. a difference between treated and control subjects) but part of this variation within treated and control observations is due to covariates (observed or unobserved). Noisy outcomes will make it harder to distinguish control from treated observations. Imagine that we could regress $r_0$ on some set of covariates on the matrix $x$ but not $Z$; say these covariates are known from previous literature to predict aggregate turnout. The residuals from such a regression, $e$, should be less variable than $r_0$ and uncorrelated with $x$ (meaning that a regression of $e$ on $x$ would produce an $R^2 \approx 0$.) Such a regression does not involve looking at effects of treatment, thus, protecting our inferences from concerns about data mining. But such a regression is impossible since we do not observe $r_0$ for cities were $Z = 1$.

Of course, the same logic of replacing $r_0$ with $R - \tau_0Z$ can be used to test a hypothesis about a particular configuration of potential responses to control. Rosenbaum (2002b, §4) shows us that we can define a “residual producing function” or perhaps a “denoising function” (our terms, his idea) $\tilde{\epsilon}(r_0, x) = e$ and, given some model of effects, one can test hypotheses $H_0 : \tau = \tau_0$ using $t(Z, e)$. To summarize, a linear model can aid the production of randomization justified confidence intervals via the following steps:

**Define a function to produce residuals** $\tilde{\epsilon}(r_0, x) = e$. This could be OLS, influential point resistant regression, or a smoother. The residuals, $e$ will be calculated from fixed quantities $r_0$ and $x$ and so will be fixed.

**Compute adjusted outcomes based on a** $H_0 : \tau = \tau_0$. Since $r_0 = r_1 - \tau$, we can calculate $e_0 = \tilde{\epsilon}(R - \tau_0Z, x)$ where $x$ is a matrix of covariates predicting $R$.

**Compute** $t(Z, e_0)$ and compare to $t(z, e_0; z \in \Omega)$ $p$-values and CIs follow directly.

Although the step of using a model of outcomes to enhance the randomization inference does add more stories that require their own justification, the process of justification ought to be less burdensome than it would otherwise be if the inference itself were based on a DGP model. First, notice that one would not make this step to using a model of outcomes if one did not know something about the outcomes. That is, in the absence of knowledge about outcomes, the confidence intervals already produced suffice.

Second, this outcome model is meant only to reduce noise in the outcomes. A cor-

---

[17] Work emphasizing average effects to be understood and broadened: For example, Hansen and Bowers (2009) show a Neyman-style approach to estimating causal effects using a test statistic that is not a constant average effect and that is defined from a Fisherian point of view. [Cite to pages in Lehmann and Cox showing that Neyman and Fisher are both doing pretty much the same randomization inference.]
rect specification is not required. Incorrect specifications will add noise and will thus make the CI wider but will not change the coverage of the CI. We emphasized \( \tilde{\varepsilon}(r_0, x) \) above — a noise-reduction or residual-producing function — rather than \( R = x\beta \) in part because we never need to examine the coefficients let alone assess uncertainty about them in this model. Recall that the only source of randomness in this framework about which we have confidence is \( Z \), and \( \tilde{\varepsilon}(r_0, x) \) does not include \( Z \). Thus, it has the status of a smoother or other data summary/description, not of a model of a data generating process. Thus, there is less to justify from the perspective of the technical features of the model. This is not to say that one must not be thoughtful in choosing such a model — a bad choice could inflate the confidence interval.

Figure 1 shows the 88% CIs that arise from different covariance adjustment specifications. Each confidence interval is labeled with the linear model formula from our noise-reduction function, and the intervals are plotted in order of width (widest on top, narrowest on bottom). We also include three models which use draws from the normal distribution as covariates — i.e. merely including noise as a covariate. The confidence interval without covariance adjustment \([-6–7]\) is labeled \( r_0 \) — it is the 4th line from the top of the plot. The top two lines represent the 88% confidence intervals from the two noisiest noise models (one with a draw from a \( N(10,5) \) and the other with a draw from \( N(0,5) \)). In fact, these two intervals are truncated — we did not test hypotheses beyond -10, 10. So, adding noise expands the intervals.

Conversely, covariates which predict the outcome reduces the interval: the bottom line is an 88% CI running from -1 to 5 percentage points of turnout after removing the linear and additive relationships between median age and percent black (both 2000 census figures for the cities) and post-treatment turnout. We will return to the question about how to choose a covariance adjustment specification in § 2.6.

Covariance Adjustment for Imbalance   Recall that we worried in § 1.1 about about the fact that, within matched set, previous turnout was not exactly same between the two cities — and that, perhaps simple treatment-minus-control differences might overstate the treatment effect. One could also define a test statistic which would remove the effect of baseline turnout from post-treatment turnout. For example, Table 6 replicates and extends Table 1 including data on other covariates. We might calculate the treatment effect for Sioux City of 22-16=6 given the comparison city of Saginaw. Of that 6, however, one might imagine that at least 4 points of that are due to the baseline difference in turnout between the cities, and so the “true” treatment effect ought to be 6-4=2. Thus, one could imagine a simple generalization of our mean differences test statistic (equation 1) which would write the baseline-adjusted effect for pair \( b \) using \( r_{pre} \) to mean baseline turnout as:

\[ \text{Covariance Adjustment for Imbalance} \]
Figure 1: 88% Confidence Intervals for effects of Newspapers advertisements on Turnout (Percentage Points of Turnout). All models run with pair-aligned data [i.e. treated-control outcomes and covariates] (equiv. fixed effects for pair). Here \( \ell(r_{0t}, x) \) uses OLS. Turnout in the previous election is labeled \( r_{0t-1} \). Covariates “hhinc”=”Household Income” and “age” are median 2000 census figures for the city, “% blk” is percent black as of 2000 census. Noise only models have covariates labeled “rnorm” and represent random draws from Normal distributions N(0,1), N(0,5) and N(10,5). The 88% CIs for the N(0,5) and N(10,5) noise models are wider than -10 to 10 but are truncated here.

For those comfortable with linear models for estimating effects, equation (8) represents a change score or “gain score” model (i.e. \( R_t - R_{t-1} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Z \)); a model which is equivalent to \( R_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Z + R_{t-1} \). And it is common to re-express such models

\[
\begin{align*}
t(Z, R, r_{\text{pre}})_b &= \left( \frac{\Sigma_i Z_i^T R_{bi} - \Sigma_i (1 - Z_i^T) R_{bi}}{\Sigma_i Z_{bi}} \right) - \left( \frac{\Sigma_i Z_i^T r_{\text{pre},bi} - \Sigma_i (1 - Z_i^T) r_{\text{pre},bi}}{\Sigma_i Z_{bi}} \right) \\
&= \text{Mean Treated–Control Post-Treatment Turnout Difference in Pair } b - \text{ Mean Treated–Control Baseline Turnout in Pair } b.
\end{align*}
\]

(8)

Another strategy to account for these baseline differences would be to use percentage change as the test statistic. Consider the Sioux City versus Saginaw pair: our current adjustment would calculate \((22-16) - (21-17) = (22-21) - (16-17) = 2\) as the adjusted effect. We could also use percentage changes: for example, if a treated city had a turnout of 2 at baseline but a turnout of 4 after treatment we might say that turnout doubled, or that the percentage change was 4/2=200%. So, in our case we would have \((22/21) - (16/17) = .1\) or a positive change from baseline of 10%. I don’t pursue this strategy here because it is harder to decode, for example: 10% change in this case is the same as an adjusted turnout.
Table 6: Design, covariates and outcomes in the Newspapers Experiment. Treatment with the newspaper ads is coded as 1 and lack of treatment is coded as 0 in the ‘Treatment’ column. % Black, Median Age, and Median Household Income (1000s) from the 2000 Census. Numbers are rounded integers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Pair</th>
<th>Treatment</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>% Black</th>
<th>Median Age</th>
<th>Median HH Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saginaw</td>
<td>MI</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sioux City</td>
<td>IA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle Creek</td>
<td>MI</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midland</td>
<td>MI</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxford</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowell</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yakima</td>
<td>WA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richland</td>
<td>WA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

without requiring that the baseline outcome enter with a fixed coefficient of 1 so that we might write \( R_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Z + \beta_2 R_{t-1} \). The lines in Figure [1] with the covariate \( r_{0t-1} \) reflect exactly this kind of baseline adjustment — only without basing inference for the effect of treatment on post-treatment outcomes on the \( \beta_1 \) in a linear model.

Notice also in Table 6 that other covariates display some imbalance: especially notice that the percent black in the treated city is higher than the percent black in the control city in each pair and that the median household income displays the same pattern. Such a patterns might make us worry about the randomization procedure applied here. It turns out that one can use exactly the same procedures shown earlier to test the sharp null hypothesis of no relationship between percent black and treatment assignment. The \( p \)-value for this test is .125: the null of no effect would fall just outside an 88% confidence interval as implausible (the 88% CI based on the same exact rank-based test as used here runs from -41.9 to -1 for % black and from 10 to 24 for median household income measured in $1000). What this really means is that differences in black percent or median income are not large enough individually to greatly confuse confidence intervals based on treatment assignment. Yet, the relationship between treatment and percent black, for example, and turnout is strong enough to cause adjustment for it to be even more powerful a precision enhancement than adjustment for baseline outcomes. In general, this framework for statistical inference can be used for placebo tests or randomization procedure assessments just as it can be used to produce plausible ranges of treatment effects [cite to Abadie and Sekhon and Titiunik on placebo tests].

Did newspaper advertisements matter for vote turnout in the cities studied? The narrowest range of plausible values — created using a composite interval following § 2.4.3 — yielded a plausible range of effects of [-1,4]. The two-sided 88% interval change of 2 percentage points — which is the more substantively meaningful metric in any case.

Hansen and Bowers (2008b) develop a randomization-based test for the hypothesis that some linear combination of multiple variables are related to treatment: in this case, this would allow us to test the hypothesis that, even if we can detect no random imbalance on % black and median household income one at time, the experiment might have random imbalance on them jointly. An equivalent small sample test using simulation rather than enumeration (Hothorn et al., 2008) produced a \( p \)-value of .13 for this omnibus null hypothesis.
Some Limitations of Rosenbaum Style Covariance Adjustment

Notice that we cannot include all of our covariates in this model: after accounting for pairs we have at most 3 degrees of freedom. And using all 3 reduces the variability in the residuals to nearly zero — thus making the null of no differences between treated and controls on the residuals always very plausible. That is, we speculate that, in this small experiment, part of the variance in the outcome that is being removed as extraneous to the treatment effect is in fact related to the treatment effect — and that, in the extreme, one can remove so much noise from the outcomes as to make any differences between treated and control disappear. Thus, we do not adjust for baseline-outcomes and % black and median age, but only for subsets of 2 of these variables at a time here.

In his article introducing these ideas, Rosenbaum (2002b), eschews OLS and instead uses Huber and Ronchetti (2009)’s robust regression to down-weight high leverage observations. The Newspapers study does not display particularly high leverage points in any of the regressions run above, thus, when we replicated the OLS models using the M-estimator, we saw no changes.

The potential for covariance adjustment to overfit the data and the potential for a few observations to unduly influence the fit suggest some limits to the application of this approach to small datasets like the one used here. The imbalance on some of the covariates was adjustable, but the adjustment also caused the CIs to “bounce” or not to remain exactly centered over the same central range of values. Yet, the imbalance was not severe enough (and the information in the data was small enough) such that the narrower plausible ranges of treatment effects tended to also to be plausible in the lights of the wider intervals.

These limitations do suggest some avenues for elaboration and extension of these procedures. Bayesian covariance adjustment would answer many of the concerns about overfitting and might allow more substantive information to be brought to bear on the problems of influential points.

2.6 Power Analyses Allow Choice of Covariance Adjustment Model

Rosenbaum reminds us that:

> Although randomization inference using the responses themselves and ignoring the covariates yields tests with the correct level and confidence intervals with the correct coverage rate, more precise inference might have

---

29 These intervals were actually tested with hypotheses ranging from -10 to 10 in intervals of .1 but the results reported here are rounded to integers for ease of reading. The actual ranges were: two-sided interval = [-.8, 5.1], composite interval=[-.7, 3.7].

30 We use the term “leverage” here to refer to the fact that we are worried about observations that are very different from others on the scale of the covariates, not necessarily highly “influential” observations which also might have a large effect β on a linear model. When we replicated our analyses we followed Rosenbaum (2002b) § 2.4) in using Huber’s M-estimator as implemented in the rlm function packaged with R.

31 For binary outcomes, see especially the promising ideas in Gelman et al. (2008) or alternatively the frequentist development of shrinkage models as described Zorn (2005).
been possible if the variation in fitted values had been removed. (Rosenbaum, 2002b, page 290)

We have shown how to make our inference more precise using substantive knowledge. Although, in exchange for methodological discussion, we did not carefully argue for our covariance adjustment model using substantive knowledge here. And, we displayed a variety of such models to illustrate how the confidence intervals react to such adjustment, whereas a substantive analyst would, presumably just show one such interval in addition to the simpler, unadjusted interval. But, how should he choose one (or few) covariance adjustment specifications among the many? Running many many different linear models searching for the one which provides the lowest \(p\)-value on the treatment effect is not the way to go. [more on multiple testing problems and relatedly discretion]

Even in this small dataset, there are many possible ways to increase precision by covariance adjustment, and if there is random imbalance, such adjustment may actually shift the center of the interval. Here we propose and demonstrate a principled way to choose among covariance adjustment specifications on the basis of statistical power. Recall that from the perspective used so far we assess treatment effects using linear models merely to transform our response (a residual is just a transformed response). It is well known that different functions of the response may have more or less power to detect treatment effects under different data configurations. For example, when \(R\) is approximately Normal, tests using means tend to offer tighter confidence intervals than tests using ranks, conversely, when \(R\) has long tails, is skewed, or otherwise has large outliers, then tests using ranks out-perform tests using means [cites to Lehmann among others on this]. If one it not estimating treatment effects, one may compare the performance of a means-based with that of a ranks-based test without worry that one is actively inspecting the treatment effect [cite to Rosenbaum and/or Imbens and Rubin].

That is, Fisher-style randomization inference allows us, in principle, to compare the performance of test statistics. The \(t(Z,e)\) calculated from the different regression specifications in § 2.5 are each different test statistics, and are thus comparable in terms of their power.

Here is our procedure (which we do here 500 times):

1. Simulate outcomes based on the control group within each pair by drawing two values from a Normal distribution with mean=control mean, and sd=1.
2. Entertain a “true” value for \(\tau\) and given our maintained model of effects \(r_{1i} = r_{0i} + \tau\), calculate simulated responses \(\tilde{r}_i, \tilde{r}_{1i} = \tilde{r}_{0i} + \tau\). Thus, after steps (1) and (2) we have \(\tilde{r}_{1ib} \sim N(r_{0ib} + \tau, 1)\) and \(\tilde{r}_{0b} \sim N(r_{0ib}, 1)\) for cities \(i\) in pairs \(b\).

The treatment assignment status and covariates are held fixed. The relationship between treatment and covariates will be the same as it is in the original dataset. The relationships between the covariates and responses to control will also be the same in the simulated dataset as they are in the original dataset.

3. Assess the strict null of no effects against the one-sided alternative of \(\tau > 0\) using both rank-based and mean-based test statistics on the residuals from a variety of covariance adjustment specifications.
The proportion of \( p \)-values lower than some fixed number \( \alpha \) is a reasonable comparative measure of power here: For each entertained treatment effect \( \tau \), we test the null that \( H_0 : \tau = 0 \). Recall that a powerful test is one which rejects the null when the alternative is true. Here, we set the alternative to a series of values (that is, the alternative is always true, and it is just more or less easy to detect as \( \tau \) increases — larger \( \tau \) ought to be easier to detect). Thus, larger \( \tau \) should be associated with smaller \( p \)-values. Consider two tests of \( H_0 : \tau = 0 \) against \( H_A : \tau \geq 0 \). With a sample size of 8, an entertained \( \tau = 5 \) could count as a different amount of evidence against the null: a powerful test might consider it a lot of evidence, a less powerful test might consider it little evidence.

Figure 2: Power assessments for three linear models (\( r_0 \) stands for no model or equivalently a constant model) and two test statistics as applied to the residuals of those models. The left panel shows average exact one-sided \( p \)-values over 500 simulations of the response to control. The right panel shows the proportion of \( p \)-values \( \leq .125 \). While the mean-based test (in red) has lower mean \( p \)-values than the rank-based test (in black) for any given \( \tau \), the discreteness of the randomization distributions (and the lack of outliers in the continuous response) leads the mean and rank based tests to reject the null at \( \alpha = .125 \) the same proportion of the time for any given linear model and \( \tau \). All tests consistently and correctly reject the null by the time the true treatment effect is 6 percentage points of turnout.

\[ ^{32} \] Imbens and Rubin use proportion of \( p \)-values less than .1 as a way to compare power of tests [their draft book]
model with two covariates.

The right panel highlights this difference — in this case, in fact, there is no difference in proportion of \( p \)-values less than .125 between the rank-based and the means-based exact tests. If the true \( \tau = 3 \), a test based on the unadjusted outcomes would reject the null at \( \alpha = .125 \) 73\% of the time while a test based on the model with two covariates would reject the false null at the same significance level 85\% of the time.

Most of the literature on Fisher-style randomization inference suggests comparative power analyses as one of the inputs to a decision about a test statistic. Rather than compare rank-based to mean-based (to log-based to median-based) tests, we use this technology to give us insight into covariance adjustment in such a way as to avoid looking directly at an estimate of the treatment effect. Notice that one may assess the power of candidate covariance adjustment specifications in advance. This stands in contrast to estimating effects using the linear model for both adjustment and statistical inference — each run of the model in that case allows the analyst to look at the \( p \)-value for the estimated treatment effect and thus becomes a kind of informal data-mining activity.

Notice that this assessment focused on using the linear model for precision enhancement, not random imbalance adjustment. Balance tests on the residuals of the linear models would address concerns about whether a given linear model specification effectively adjusted for random imbalance.

2.7 Assessing a Model of Effects
If our model of effects is correct, then if we remove the effect from each treated observation, any remaining differences between the treatment and the control group ought to be due only to chance. Say we assume \( r_{1i} = r_{0i} + \tau \), and, given this model, our estimate of \( \tau \) accounting for the design of the experiment is 1.5\(^3\). Figure 3 shows how one might go about this kind of assessment\(^4\). The left panel shows the data as collected — the vertical axis is proportion turning out the vote in the city minus the mean proportion turning out to vote in the pair, thus removing the “pair effect” from the data. The dark lines in the middle of the boxplots are the control and treatment group means. Visual inspection suggests some kind of positive treatment effect, and the general shifting of the distribution in the treatment group relative to the distribution in the control group supports the model of constant additive effects (although the different within pair differences might argue against such a model). The right panel repeats the same plot for the control group but applies the estimated \( \tau \) to the treatment group in accord with our model of effects. Now the mean turnout in the treatment group is the same as the mean in the control group. And the middle portions of both distributions (indicated by the box in the boxplot) also are the same. However, the medians still differ, with the median in the treatment group higher than the median in the control group. This model does bring 3 out of 4 of the individual cities closer to their matched control, but it increases the distance within the triangle

\(^3\)It turns out that the median of the confidence intervals produced using the most powerful covariance adjustment formula (the one using age and % black) is 1.5 and this is a reasonable point estimate.

\(^4\)This is inspired by Rosenbaum (2010, Chapter 2) in which he compares additive, multiplicative, and “Tobit” threshold models of effects of a job training program.
pair, and more importantly, still leaves some of the turnout in the treatment group unaccounted for.

Figure 3: Raw responses of control and treated cities (left panel) and raw control responses compared to treated responses adjusted for a constant, additive model of effects (right panel). A correct model of effects would make the two groups look equivalent but for random noise. Pairs are marked with symbols. Since the baseline turnout differed between pairs, turnout here has been “aligned” or “pair-mean centered” to enable easier visual comparison of responses.

What about a weaker hypothesis? Perhaps something more like \( r_{1i} = r_{0i} + \tau_i \) but where we are predominantly interested in the average difference in potential outcomes? There is a sense in which our assessment of the constant, additive effects model is an assessment of our model of an average treatment effect. Of course, there are many possible collections of \( \tau \) which could produce the same average of 1.5. (for example, we could have some enormously positive effects within some pairs and enormously negative effects within other pairs — or no effect in all but 1 pair, but a large and counterbalancing effect in the other pairs.) Thus, although this diagnostic for models of effects was designed to compare what happens given sharp and focused models of effects, it could also be useful to assess the usefulness of the more fuzzy average treatment effect presumption.

3 Discussion
3.1 Credible Inference is Possible without a DGP in a Small Randomized Field Experiment

We have shown that statistical inference does not require a model of outcomes or a model of effects as long as (1) one restricts attention to tests of the sharp null of no effect and (2) one believes one’s model of assignment. Inference about effects (rather than no effect) requires adding substantive knowledge about the process relating treatment to potential outcomes (i.e. a model of effects)\[35\] Rejecting null hypotheses

\[35\]Note that this is one way in which Fisher’s framework differs from Neymans: Neyman poses a “weak” null (about average differences) and focuses attention on estimating a difference of averages —
about effects may either indicate that $\tau \neq \tau_0$ or that the model of effects is wrong. Inference can be made more precise if the analyst knows something about the outcomes and uses this information for noise-reduction. At no point did we rest the validity of the coverage of the confidence interval on a DGP process model or asymptotics, although we did add more and more structure to the inference. What is nice about this, we think, is that one can base statistical inference in experiments on some very credible stories. Although most confident with tests of the sharp null of no effects, one is not restricted to such tests, and, in fact, DGP-models can be harnessed so that inference about effects is targeted as precisely as possible on those parts of the outcome not determined by well-known covariates. Those who know the history of statistics will not find these facts surprising, although they might be happy to see how the work of Neyman and Fisher can be extended to handle modern data analysis problems. Others, whose only training in statistics has occurred within departments of political science, sociology, or economics, will be, we hope, pleasantly surprised.

This investigation of the Newspapers experiment also yields a few implications for design of studies. First, small samples do not require analysts to eschew probabilistic inference. We have long known that Bayesian inference is possible in small samples. And this paper shows another mode of inference that may also be useful. Second, this study re-emphasizes the importance of substantive information about the outcome of interest in helping “permitting the phenomenon under test to manifest itself” (Fisher 1935, page 24). Assigning treatment within sets of units which are homogeneous on the outcome enhances the precision of estimation. Thus, in a study with few units it is wise to stratify before assigning treatment. Substantive information is also important in allowing for effective covariance adjustment and in justifying the model of effects that is maintained in order to test effects.

In a sense, randomization inference allows scientific attention to return back to the political phenomena of interest: what causes what? what counter-factuals ought we to entertain? what units received the treatment, in what way? That more information is better within this framework is a good thing. Randomized experiments make models of assignment more credible (in general) than observational studies. And randomized experiments are a natural place to apply these methods. In cases where physical randomization has occurred, then it is certain that the scholar knows a lot more about the assignment mechanism than anything else. In that case, there are few arguments against using randomization inference in principle although one may pragmatically approximate randomization-based results using other methods.

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36 There is also some interesting recent research on higher order asymptotics which appears to allow DGP based inference to proceed in small samples as well [Brazzale et al. (2006); Strawderman (2000)].

37 Any textbook’s treatment of the paired versus unpaired t-test will attest to this fact dramatically (See, for example Rice 2007 § 11.3). Rosenbaum (2005) shows this nicely, but we have long known about this from at least Kish (1965), [find part of Campbell, Stanley, let alone Blalock, etc...], and also have recent advice re-emphasizing this fact from Imai et al. (2008).

38 Keele et al. (2008) provide a detailed argument in favor of applying these kinds of techniques to laboratory experiments.
3.2 Common Questions and Concerns

3.2.1 What about Time-series? Or Factor Analysis?

Past work shows how these basic ideas can be extended: to instrumental variables (Imbens and Rosenbaum 2005), to clustered assignment within pairs (Imai et al. 2008), to clustered assignment with instrumental variables and a binary outcome (Hansen and Bowers 2009), to other multilevel designs (Braun 2003; Small et al. 2008) to longitudinal data (Haviland et al. 2007), and to cases with interference between units (thus violating a part of the SUTVA assumption) (Rosenbaum 2007).

We have not seen randomization inference used in situations with extensive non-random missingness in the outcomes in addition to non-random selection of units into complex intermediate outcome classes (labeled by Frangakis and Rubin 2002 as “principal strata”). Nor do we know about extensive applications to complex structural models of causality or measurement (i.e. no time-series, no structural equation models, no IRT/factor analysis). There is nothing inherent about randomization inference which would prevent application elsewhere, but it has just not received the kinds of sustained attention that the linear model has received over the past 50 years.

3.2.2 How can we learn about the population by focusing on the sample?

By conditioning our statistical inference on the sample at hand, one might worry that we compromise the scientific importance of conclusions emerging from the analysis. That is, one might ask, “Who cares that the effect of some causal process was $\tau$ in your sample? I care about the population, or about future time points, or about other possible samples.” We think that external validity is as important as internal validity in the eventual judgement of the scholarly community about the value of a study or theory or finding. We don’t believe, however, that one is required to answer the question, “What happened in your study?” in terms of a (possibly unknown and undefined) population let alone other samples (across time and/or space). In fact, we feel that randomization inference improves the ability of researchers to talk about the general from the specific. By offering researchers the ability to have great confidence that what they are seeing in their specific sample is actually what was happening in that sample (or that their sample does not provide enough information to offer much information about their chosen test statistic), researchers have a much more solid sense of the specific from which to address the general.

We do believe that statements about causality as regards a social scientific theory must involve consideration of the general (as long as the general is defined clearly). That is, a clear effect of a treatment in only one sample, once, and that is never replicated or replicable, does not tell us as much about a general causal theory as such an effect which can be replicated and is replicated. (And perhaps, more strongly and also more realistically, any given causal theory ought to imply a host of observational phenomenon and effects — some of them are easier to see in certain situations and samples than others — and what happens in one sample, in fact, then, ought to reflect directly on the theory without any reference to external validity [cite Rosenbaum].) That is, imagine we were skeptical about the equation governing the velocity of a ball dropped from a height. That equation (an operationalization of a theory) ought to

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39For discussions of “external” and “internal” validity see (cite Campbell or others).
imply something about this ball from this height and if we don’t observe what we’d expect to see in this specific instance then the theory is cast (perhaps weakly) into doubt. And the precision and confidence with which we can talk about this specific instance adds to the strength of this doubt. Of course, replication would also add to the doubt. But, it is our hunch that replication would strengthen the doubt less so on an occasion by occasion basis than the research design and analysis of a particular critical implication of the theory.

In general, thinking that a linear specification or a likelihood or a prior offers the analyst any inherent confidence in generalizability is, we think, wrong headed. Well justified likelihoods and smooth specifications and priors may well offer us more confidence that our findings in a given study are the result of occurrences in the world and the research design rather than an accident of a series of modeling choices. But again, the confidence we desire is about the effects in a given study. And the more confidence we have in this study’s findings, the more confidence we will have when we turn to thinking about generalizing these findings; when we turn to asking what these particular findings mean for some well-defined general.

One could imagine a workflow which, given a general theory and empirical implications of it, would (1) assess the implications using a particular research design and data analysis where both design and analytic methods are chosen so as to maximize the clarity and confidence of the assessment, and (2) then the scholar would ask, “What do these findings mean for our doubt about this theory as it would apply elsewhere in the domain of application?” and (3) perhaps this question would spawn other implications which would themselves be testable in the specific and particular, and the question about the theory and general upon confrontation with the next set of confident and clear results would again raise the next set of questions and perhaps new theory.

To imagine that a single test or a single moment of data analysis can answer both “What happened in this instance?” and “What does this finding mean for other instances (places, times, circumstances)?” seems to us to ask too much of weak tools let alone weak theory (and weak humans).

What this all means is that (1) by recommending randomization inference we are deeply concerned about external validity, (2) and that we think in fact that claims about external validity and theoretical importance of specific findings are enhanced by careful attention to the specific and particular first and foremost (after careful thought about the theory and implications).

3.2.3 Testing the many hypotheses that comprise a confidence interval sounds like a big multiple comparisons problem.

Although we are testing many hypotheses to generate a confidence interval, we are only testing each hypothesis once. We do not have to adjust the 
values for these tests to account for multiple testing (the way one might want to do so in the case of running many regressions with different predictors, hunting for one with a value of less than .05 upon which to build a post-hoc story about how the outcome comes about). The CI creation is driven by pre-specification of a Type I error rate and of null hypotheses not by exploration of the data. This pre-commitment protects CIs created
from such direct inversion of hypothesis tests from multiple testing problems.

3.2.4 How should one choose a test statistic?
Randomization inference offers the advantage that an analyst may choose a test statistic that ties tightly with the substantive concerns facing the analyst and also among test statistics of equivalent substantive meaning, can choose among them for the one which will produce the tightest confidence intervals. This flexibility can be see as a disadvantage or an element of arbitrariness:

Such [randomization-based] $P$-values can be calculated for: any sharp null hypothesis . . . , any test statistic (e.g., the median difference in matched-pair differences), and any a priori definition of unusualness (e.g., squared value greater than observed squared value). Consequently, there is a great deal of arbitrariness (flexibility in the hands of a knowledgeable and wise analyst) except by convention (Rubin, 1991, page 1222).

But flexibility is also an advantage. Whereas in linear models the analyst is not asked “why a slope or a predicted probability?”, analysts using randomization inference bear the burden of explaining of why they chose their test statistic. In exchange for justifying their choices they may choose any function of treatment assignment/selection and outcomes that is most meaningful to their work and easiest to communicate to their audiences. Of course, and perhaps most importantly, different test statistics will have different power in different designs. Thus, a common convention is to use multiple different test statistics, reporting them all.

In this paper we have also presented a principled way of assessing choice of test statistic and/or covariance adjustment specification in the form of power analyses completed before estimating treatment effects but after data collection.

3.2.5 How should one choose a model of effects?
Advice about choice of a model of effects is the same as advice about choosing the specification of a linear model as it relates treatment to outcomes: one assumes that an experimental treatment has been administered because we have some hunches about how and why said treatment ought to change the outcome. These hunches (often called “theory” or “hypotheses”) specify this relationship. The nice thing about randomization-based inference is that it is easy to see how to assess the fit of a model of effects using the kinds of plots (or associated tests) we quickly demonstrated in §. Similar assessments are possible in the linear model framework: for example drawing from the implied posterior/sampling distribution of one’s coefficients and generating the distribution of predictions from the model is known to be an excellent starting point for assessing Bayesian and other outcome model dependent fits [cite to relevant discussions by Gelman and co-authors if not also Box].

3.3 Conclusion
[Ringing conclusion]
References


